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Abstract
Unclonable Secret Keys

by
Marios Georgiou
Advisor: Nelly Fazio
We propose a novel concept of securing cryptographic keys which we call “Unclonable Secret
Keys,” where any cryptographic object is modified so that its secret key is an unclonable quantum
bit-string whereas all other parameters such as messages, public keys, ciphertexts, signatures, etc., remain classical. We study this model in the authentication and encryption setting giving a plethora of
definitions and positive results as well as several applications that are impossible in a purely classical
setting.
In the authentication setting, we define the notion of one-shot signatures, a fundamental element
in building unclonable keys, where the signing key not only is unclonable, but also is restricted to
signing only one message even in the paradoxical scenario where it is generated dishonestly. We propose a construction relative to a classical oracle and prove its unconditional security. Moreover, we
provide numerous applications including a signature scheme where an adversary can sign as many
messages as it wants and yet it cannot generate two signing keys for the same public key. We show
that one-shot signatures are sufficient to build a proof-of-work-based decentralized cryptocurrency
with several ideal properties: it does not make use of a blockchain, it allows sending money over
insecure classical channels and it admits several smart contracts. Moreover, we demonstrate that a
weaker version of one-shot signatures, namely privately verifiable tokens for signatures, are sufficient
to reduce any classically queried stateful oracle to a stateless one. This effectively eliminates, in a
provable manner, resetting attacks to hardware devices (modeled as oracles).
In the encryption setting, we study different forms of unclonable decryption keys. We give constructions that vary on their security guarantees and their flexibility. We start with the simplest setting of secret key encryption with honestly generated keys and show that it exists in the quantum
random oracle model. We provide a range of extensions, such as public key encryption with dishonestly generated keys, predicate encryption, broadcast encryption and more.
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Introduction

1.1

Hybrid Quantum/Classical Cryptography

Quantum computing and quantum information promise to reshape the cryptographic landscape.
In the near term, quantum computers will be able to break much of the cryptography currently
used today Sho97 , with the field of post-quantum cryptography developing new alternative protocols. On the other hand, quantum cryptography will leverage quantum communication to open
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new possibilities such as information-theoretically secure key agreement BB84 , physically unclonable
money Wie83 , and more.
Yet, even in a world full of quantum computers, classical cryptosystems and communication will
still play a fundamental role. The unclonability of quantum data, for example, means that tasks
such as backing up a quantum hard drive or forwarding a quantum email (while still keeping the
original) will be impossible. Even in a world where quantum computing is commonplace, it may
be infeasible to run a quantum computer in many computing environments, such as mobile or
embedded devices. It may also be some time before our communication infrastructure is updated to
support the transfer of quantum data; besides, most data users will care about is still classical, so it
may seem as overkill to use quantum information to send such data. With classical communication,
however, most of the exciting developments from quantum cryptography become unusable. This
then leads to the following natural question:
When exchanging only classical information, can local quantum
computing still offer advantages over purely classical systems.
In some cases, the answer is certainly negative. For example, information-theoretic key agreement BB84 is impossible with classical communication, even if local quantum operations are allowed.
Indeed, in quantum key distribution, security is only obtained because the honest parties can detect
if the adversary is eavesdropping; on the other hand, with classical communication, the adversary
can listen to the communication undetected. Another related example is information-theoretic key
recycling OH05,DPS05,GYZ17 .
Hybrid quantum/classical cryptography.

On the other hand, in an emerging field that

we will call hybrid quantum/classical cryptography — or hybrid quantum cryptography for short —
it has been shown that local quantum operations can yield an advantage in some settings. Recent
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work has shown how to attain certiﬁable randomness expansion BCM

+ 18

, which enables a classical

client, for whom generating true randomness is a notoriously difficult task, to verifiably outsource
the generation of random bits to a quantum computer, which can generate random bits easily. This
task is closely related to the goal of quantum supremacy — demonstrating that quantum computers
can solve certain problems faster than classical computers — which has recently gained much attention. Certifiable randomness has also been extended to certifying arbitrary outsourced quantum
operations, again using only a classical client Mah18 .
Given the importance of classical communication in a quantum world, we anticipate such hybrid
protocols to complement post-quantum and quantum cryptography and become a third pillar of
active research at the intersection of cryptography and quantum computing. Our goal in this work
is therefore to provide new foundational tools for this emerging area and develop novel applications.

1.1.1 Motivating Example: Signature Tokens
Consider the task of signature delegation: Alice wishes to allow Bob to sign a single message on her
behalf. Alice could just give Bob her secret key, but this would allow Bob to sign any number of
messages. Alice instead wants to give Bob enough information to ensure that Bob can subsequently
sign a single arbitrary message, without any further action on Alice’s part. Crucially, we want the
message to only be decided after Alice hands this information to Bob.
Of course, this task is impossible in a purely classical world, as Bob can re-use whatever information he learned from Alice to sign any number of messages. One could hope that Alice could provide Bob with a quantum signing token, which self-destructs after signing a message. By quantum
no-cloning — which says that general unknown quantum states cannot be copied — Bob cannot
copy the token, and therefore can only sign a single message. Indeed, Ben-David and Sattath BS17
show that such quantum signing tokens are possible by building on ideas for public key quantum
money AC12 .
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No-cloning with only classical communication?

But what if we insist on classical

communication between Alice and Bob? We note that will not even allow shared entanglement,
which could be used in teleportation, essentially because shared entanglement required quantum
communication at some point in the past. How can we leverage the power of no-cloning, when any
information Alice sends to Bob can be copied ad nauseam? It would seem that if Bob can derive
a signing token from their communication, he can simply copy the communication transcript to
derive as many distinct signing tokens as he would like.
The issue is actually very general, and is potentially problematic in any hybrid quantum protocol.
After all, quantum no-cloning and related concepts can be seen as the foundation for essentially all
of the novel features in quantum protocols. But now, what if we insist on only classical communication, relegating all quantum operations to local computation? This means that any application of
no-cloning applies to states that the adversary constructed entirely on his own. How can we guarantee
no-cloning, if the adversary controls the entire process used to generate the state in the first place?
Why can’t the adversary just run the same process twice, generating two copies?
Perhaps surprisingly, we will demonstrate that with a single classical back-and-forth between
Alice and Bob, Alice can send Bob a single-use quantum signature token. In doing so, we demonstrate how to overcome the difficulty outlined above and leverage no-cloning in a setting where all
communication is classical.
A Toy Example.

How is this possible? To illustrate how classical communication might be com-

bined with local no-cloning, we recall a basic scenario described by Zhandry Zha19 , which also underlies the recent developments in certifiable randomness/quantum computation BCM

+ 18,Mah18

. Let H

be a many-to-one hash function that is collision-resistant against quantum attacks. First, generate a
uniform superposition of inputs. Next, compute the hash H in superposition and measure the reE
sult, obtaining a value y. The original state collapses to the superposition ψy of all pre-images x of
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y.

E
Using the above procedure, it is easy to sample states ψy . However, at the same time it is imposE
sible to sample two copies of the same ψy , assuming the collision-resistance of H. Indeed, assume
E
toward contradiction that it were possible to generate two identical copies of ψy . Then simply
measure both copies; each measurement will likely yield a different x, resulting in two distinct values
mapping to the same y, a contradiction.
A First Attempt. As a first attempt at a signature delegation protocol, we have Bob sample a
 E 
pair ψy , y , and send the classical value y to Alice. Alice then signs y using some standard postquantum signature scheme, sending the resulting signature σ back to Bob. The result is that, with
 E

only classical communication between Alice and Bob, Bob has arrived at a value ψy , y, σ that
he cannot clone (due to the collision resistance of H), nor can he sample on his own (due to needing
Alice’s signature on y).
Of course, we have to also describe how



E

ψy , y, σ can be used to sign a single message, but

not two. For general hash functions H, there is likely no meaningful way to accomplish this. For
E
example, if the hash function is collapsing Unr16a , then having ψy is essentially no more useful than
having a single classical pre-image x. But of course a classical pre-image x cannot be used as a onetime signing token, since it can be copied. Recent evidence suggests that typical post-quantum hash
functions are likely collapsing Unr16a,LZ19 .
Toward a solution, we observe that our protocol so far bears resemblance to the chameleon signatures of Krawczyk and Rabin KR00 . Here, H is replaced with a special type of hash function, called a
chameleon hash. In such a hash function, Bob knows a trapdoor T which allows him to “open” the
hash y to any message m′ of his choosing. In particular, given y and any message m′ , Bob can find an
r′ such that H(m′ , r′ ) = y.
We immediately see that chameleon hashing provides a partial solution to signature tokens. In-
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deed, Bob can choose the hashing key H together with a secret trapdoor T, and send Alice any hash
y, which Alice then signs using her signing key. To sign a message m, Bob can then use the trapdoor to open y to any message m, computing an r such that H(m, r) = y. Finally, Bob can then
output (m, r, y, σ) as the signature on m. The recipient will verify Alice’s signature on y and that
H(m, r) = y.
This certainly works for delegating signatures. It is also mimics how signing authority is delegated
in practice, where instead of signing a hash, Alice would sign the a public key for Bob’s signature
scheme. But this standard delegation mechanism of course cannot provide the one-time property
we are looking for, as it is purely classical. Indeed, unforgeability relies on the collision resistance of
H, which means Bob can break unforgeability using his trapdoor. In particular, Bob can re-use his
trapdoor as many times as he wishes, opening y to any number of messages of his choice.
Our Solution: one-shot chameleon hashing.

To remedy this issue, we imagine that Bob

has a variant of chameleon hash functions, where any given trapdoor can be used only a single time.
Specifically, we want that the hash function remains collision resistant even to Bob. In more detail,
we define a one-shot chameleon hash function as a hash function H with the following property: it is
possible to first sample a hash y together with a one-time quantum trapdoor |T⟩. Then, after seeing
a message m, it is possible to use the trapdoor |T⟩ to sample r such that H(m, r) = y. Importantly,
anyone can sample a y, |T⟩ pair, and H is collision resistant to everyone. This implies that once |T⟩ is
used to compute r, it must self-destruct, preventing further openings. This in particular implies that
|T⟩ cannot be classical, else it could be copied as many times as Bob would like.
Notice that all communication — namely y and σ — is classical. We also stress that we want H to
be a classical function. As such, Bob’s quantum operations are entirely local. What’s more, Bob is
the only party that is running a quantum computer; Alice can be purely classical.

6

Generalization: one-shot signatures.

We can even abstract the protocol above slightly,

to work with a more general object called one-shot signatures. Here, anyone with a quantum computer can sample a classical public key pk, together with quantum secret key |sk⟩. Given |sk⟩ and
a message m, it is possible to compute a classical signature r on m. Then anyone, knowing just the
public key, can verify signatures. For security, we require that it is infeasible to compute a tuple
(pk, m0 , r0 , m1 , r1 ) such that m0 ̸= m1 , and r0 and r1 are valid signatures of m0 , m1 respectively,
with respect to the public key pk. We see that one-shot chameleon hashing is just a special case of
one-shot signatures where verification simply evaluates H(m, r), and checks that the result is pk.
Remark 1. Note that one-time signatures — signatures whose security is only guaranteed when used
to sign a single message — are well known classically Lam79 , and can be built from the simplest tools in
cryptography, namely one-way functions. For one-time signatures, the signer should sign only a single
message, else they risk revealing their secret key. However, with one-time signatures, there is nothing
actually preventing the signer from signing two or more messages, if they decide it is advantageous
to do so. With a one-shot signature, in contrast, no matter what the signer does or what security he is
willing to give up, he can only ever sign a single message. This difference is the crucial feature of oneshot signatures.
At this point, it should be un-obvious that one-shot signatures can even exist. After all, one-shot
signatures can be seen as an extremely strong variant of the quantum no-cloning theorem. The original no-cloning theorem dealt with truly unknown quantum states, which were useless to anyone
who did not know the states, and therefore for whom no-cloning applied. Public key quantum
money Aar09 can be seen as a strengthening, where no-cloning still holds even for parties that have the
ability to verify the state. Even this verifiable version of no-cloning has been notoriously difficult to
achieve. Quantum lightning is then a further strengthening, where no-cloning holds even for parties that devised the original state themselves; the only existing construction is that of Zhandry Zha19 ,
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which is based on new ad hoc hardness assumptions.
One-shot signatures can then be interpreted as yet a further strengthening of quantum lightning
where the un-clonable state has been endowed with the ability to sign a message.

1.2

Unclonable Keys

The one-shot property of one-shot signatures yields a natural question. Can we apply it to other
cryptographic objects such as encryption? Perhaps we can build a form of one-shot decryption
where one’s secret key can be used to decrypt only once and then self-destruct. Or is there an inherent property of signatures that allows for one signature and that other cryptographic objects lack? It
turns out that this one-shot property of algorithms is only achievable when the algorithm we want
to generate a one-shot version of, is not deterministic. Here, by non-deterministic we mean that the
outputs of the algorithm are more than one and all of them are valid. In the case of signatures this is
not a problem, a message can have several (even exponentially many) signatures and generating any
of them is equally valid. In a commitment scheme, a message can have several openings and generating any of them is accepted by the verifier. The same, however, does not hold for decryption; the
correctness of encryption/decryption requires that a ciphertext can decrypt to a unique message.
Nonetheless, a specific property of one-shot signatures, that of unclonability of the secret keys,
could still translate to other primitives. Ideally, we even want to remove the one-shot property and
devise constructions (signatures and encryptions) where one can use the secret key as many times as
it wants, yet it remains unclonable. Quantum computing suggests a solution to the scenarios above:
by the no-cloning theorem WZ82 which is implied by the principle that quantum operations are linear,
quantum information cannot be copied. Therefore, if we make the secret key a quantum state, in
principle the key cannot be copied in order to run on more than a single device.
Actually instantiating this idea, however, is highly non-trivial. While no-cloning insists that in
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general a quantum state cannot be copied, in its most basic form it applies essentially to random
states. As shown by Wiesner Wie83 and Bennett and Brassard BB14 , such no-cloning is useful for certain tasks like basic versions of quantum money or information-theoretic key agreement. However,
these applications need no additional functionality from the quantum state, beyond the fact that
quantum states cannot be copied. In our case, however, not only do we need secret keys to be unclonable, we need them to be useful secret keys. This leads to the following natural question:
Can quantum information be used to force a secret
key to only work on a single device at a time.
In other words, we are looking for very strong variants of the no-cloning theorem, where the
state is not only unclonable, but also useful. A very general notion of such no-cloning was first investigated by Aaronson Aar09 , who describe “quantum copy protection”, namely turning general
programs into quantum states that cannot be copied. Such a general notion would naturally encompass unclonable secret keys. However, this notion suffers from definitional difficulties AF16 , and has
so far not been meaningfully achievable for more than the simplest of functionalities.

1.3

Contributions

In this thesis, we answer the above questions in the affirmative providing new definitions and constructions and proving their security.

1.3.1 One-Shot Signatures
We formalize the notion of one-shot signatures and we provide a construction relative to a classical
oracle which we can then obfuscate using existing obfuscation techniques to get the first candidate
of one-shot signatures in the plain model. We show that one-shot signatures have several applications:
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1. They yield to a classical protocol for signature delegation of a single message.
2. They can be used to build budget signatures, where the secret key can sign several messages as
long as their cost does not exceed the key’s budget.
3. They can be used to build ordered signatures, where every message comes with a time tag and
one is prevented from signing new messages with “past” tags.
4. They yield to a signature scheme where one can provably revoke the key, by simply signing a
message with tag equal to infinity.
5. They can be combined with proofs of sequential work to guarantee that not only one cannot
clone the key, but also cannot sign more than one messages per time interval.
6. They yield to public-coin classical protocols of quantumness and min-entropy.

1.3.2 Cryptocurrencies
Our delegation protocol can be combined with proofs of work to yield to the first decentralized
cryptocurrency with classical communication. To generate a new coin, one first generates a new
public key, secret key pair, and then runs a proof of work with the public key as the challenge. To
send the coin, involves running our classical delegation protocol. To spend fractions of the coin, one
can use budget signatures instead of one-shot signatures.
Moreover, our cryptocurrency scheme gives some flexibility in building smart contracts:
• Two parties can play a coin-flipping protocol where the loser is forced to pay the winner.
• One can send their money to a t-out-of-n threshold smart contract that requires at least t
valid signatures in order to spend the coin.
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• One can also build a name-service smart contract where each name can be associated with
some address. By guaranteeing that one can only add information to a coin and never delete
any information, we are assured that no two different addressed can be associated to the same
name.

1.3.3 Unclonable Signing and Decryption Keys
A simple modification of ordered signatures yields to a signature scheme where one can sign arbitrarily many messages, but is prevented from ever copying the secret key.
Combining one-shot signatures with witness encryption, we get a series of unclonable decryption
schemes. By accurately picking the language of the witness encryption, we get:
1. In its most basic form, a public key encryption scheme with unclonable decryption keys.
2. A predicate encryption scheme with the option to split the key into two keys that decrypt
different sets of attributes.
3. A broadcast encryption scheme, where any ciphertext addressed to a set S of recipients cannot be decrypted by |S| + 1 isolated adversaries.
4. A delayed decryption scheme where one not only cannot clone the key, but also cannot decrypt more than one ciphertext per time interval t. Moreover, one can revoke a specific ciphertext by generating a classical proof. As long as this proof is generated before time t has
passed, we are assured that this ciphertext will never be decrypted.

1.3.4 Stateful to Stateless Oracle Transformation
A simpler variation of one-shot signatures, namely, tokens for signatures where the adversary has
only access to the verification oracle, are sufficient to build a generic transformation of a stateful or-
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acle into a stateless oracle. As an example, assume that there is a hardware device that stores some secret information and provides an interface. For simplicity, assume that the device uses the secret key
to decrypt messages. Moreover, assume that such a device maintains some state; in our case assume
that this device can only decrypt once and then halts – this is known in the literature as a one-time
memory. Such a device may be susceptible to a resetting attack, in which case one might be able to
rewind the device to its initial state and then continue decrypting messages even after decrypting
once.
The idea of a stateful to stateless oracle transformation takes care precisely of resetting attacks.
First, conceived by Broadbent et al. BGZ18 , the goal is to use quantum cryptography to provably prevent a resetting attack. Their initial construction made use of a form of privately verifiable one-shot
signature tokens to derive a stateless token, however the security missed an important step, potentially due to the fact that the construction used a privately verifiable token instead of a publicly verifiable one. We overcome this barrier by noticing that a publicly verifiable token is sufficient for
security. Recently, Broadbent et al. proved that their construction is in fact secure as long as the adversary is limited to a linear number of queries to the token. On the positive side, their construction
relies on simple prepare and measure states without high entanglement, whereas publicly verifiable tokens must have high entanglement necessarily. We note that the transformations mentioned
above only work when the oracles are queried classically and without superposition queries. This is
necessary for deterministic classical oracles. The high level idea is that such classical oracles impose
a measurement and hence a collapse of the quantum state. By allowing superposition queries to the
oracle, one can run the whole computation of the oracle in superposition, retrieve the answer from
the oracle with certain probability (due to the determinism of the oracle), and subsequently rewind
the whole computation to the beginning.
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1.4

Related Literature

Author’s papers.

This dissertation thesis surveys the author’s papers GK15,CGLZ19,AGKZ20,GZ20 .

Comparing our primitives with classical primitives.

Several of the cryptographic no-

tions developed in this work can be thought of as “one-shot” versions of existing classical cryptographic primitives. One-shot chameleon hash functions generalize the classic equivalent introduced
by Krawczyk and Rabin KR00 . Our one-shot signatures are the one-shot analogue of one-time signatures by Lamport Lam79 in the sense that one not only is unwilling to generate a second signature but
also he is unable to. Our chain of delegations, our quantum money scheme and our ordered signatures use components from the Naor-Yung paradigm for building full-blown signatures out of onetime signatures NY89 and our budget signatures shares similarities with the Merkle signatures Mer89 .
Quantum Query Complexity.

Our query complexity lower bound uses elements from Am-

bainis’s adversary method Amb02 , as well as techniques for building public-key quantum money by
Aaronson and Christiano AC12 and tokens for digital signatures by Ben-David and Sattath BS17 . Our
construction of equivocal hash functions relative to a classical oracle extends the pick-one trick by
Ambainis et al. ARU14 and implies the existence of quantum lightning by Zhandry Zha19 . Interestingly, unlike previous results, our collision resistance lower bound is not based on the polynomial
method BBC

+ 01

. The polynomial method works well in proving indistinguishability between oracles

but little can be done when it comes to search problems. Indeed, proving that a function is collision resistant through indistinguishability from injective functions immediately implies that it is
collapsing!
Collapsing Hash Functions.

The construction of equivocal hash functions from standard

assumptions is a highly non-trivial task as shown by a line of works. Unruh Unr16b introduced the
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notion of collapsing hash functions and proved that the random oracle is collapsing. Since then, several works have proven that numerous collision resistant hash functions from standard assumptions
are collapsing Unr16a,CBH

+ 18,LZ19

and thus not equivocal.

Cryptocurrencies, Proofs of Work and Smart Contracts.

Our cryptocurrency con-

struction and its extensions share similarities with blockchain based cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin’s proof of work N

+ 08

as well as Ethereum’s concept of smart contracts W

+ 14

quantum world has also gained attention recently. Aggarwal et al. ABL

+ 17

. Mining in the

prove that there are hash

functions that are more resistant to quantum speed-ups than the current bitcoin hash function.
Quantum Money.

Quantum money, first introduced by Wiesner Wie83 , has received a lot of

attention the past decade with numerous results in the secret-key setting, where the bank must
be involved in verification. Gavinsky Gav12 has proven that quantum money where the coins are
minimally entangled is possible in this setting. Radian and Sattath RS19 recently created a secret key
quantum money scheme where the minting algorithm is also classical; they called this notion semiquantum money. However, for their protocol, spending the money still involves sending a quantum
state, and verification requires the mint. Farhi et al. FGH

+ 10

have shown that public-key quantum

money where the verification is a projective measurement onto a 1-dimensional subspace is impossible without high entanglement. As a result, since one-shot signatures imply such a quantum money
definition, secret keys have to be highly entangled.
One-time Memories.

Signature delegation can be thought of as the authentication analogue of

decryption delegation, known in the literature as one-time memories, introduced by Goldwasser et
al. GKR08 . These are memories that allow one to extract a single secret out of them. Unlike signature
delegation, one-time memories are impossible even in the quantum world, and even relative to a
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(quantum) oracle. This is because extraction is a deterministic process and, hence, the informationdisturbance tradeoff principle implies that such an extraction does not collapse a quantum state.
Proof of Quantumness.

Private coin proofs of quantumness out of standard post-quantum

assumptions have already been proposed in the literature. Brakerski et al. BCM

+ 18

have proven that

under the LWE assumption, there is a private coin interactive protocol for proof of quantumness.
Multi-device protocols.

As a precursor to the more recent hybrid quantum protocols, Col-

beck Col09 proposed a setting where a classical experimenter interacts with multiple potentially untrustworthy quantum devices, with the guarantee that the devices cannot communicate. As in our
protocols, all interaction is classical. However, Colbeck’s protocol, in addition to requiring multiple
non-communicating devices, inherently relies on the quantum devices having pre-shared entanglement in order to operate. Therefore, the quantum part of the protocol is not truly local.
Stateful to Stateless Oracles.

The concept of transforming a stateful oracle into a state-

less one was first perceived by Döttling et al. DKMQN15 . The idea of using quantum tools for such a
transformation was first attempted by Broadbent et al. BGZ15 . Its drawback was that the construction used a form of a quantum retrieval game that we do not know whether it allows verification
queries. Chung et al. CGLZ19 complete their proof by noting that allowing access to a verification
oracle, and thus using tokens for signatures, is sufficient.
Quantum Retrieval Games.

Quantum retrieval games were first defined formally and con-

structed by Gavinsky Gav12 as a building block for secret key quantum money with classical verification. The construction made use of a simple version of the hidden matching problem. Since then,
several quantum money schemes have been created based on quantum retrieval games. Their main
advantage is that the coins do not have to be highly entangled and they can tolerate errors. Georgiou
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and Kerenidis GK15 attempted to improve Gavinsky’s protocol by reducing the number of rounds in
the verification. However, similarly to the attempt of BGZ15 , the proof lacked the key ingredient of
allowing verification queries. By replacing a quantum retrieval game with a token for signatures we
can complete the proof.
Unclonable Signing Keys.

Although our work is the first studying unclonability of secret

keys in the encryption setting, there has already been some work in the authentication setting.
Starting with the work of Gavinsky Gav12 and Pastawski et al. PYJ

+ 12

, it has been shown that it

is possible to encode a secret message authentication code (MAC) key into a quantum state that
can be used to sign a message, yet cannot be cloned. Crucially, the MAC key is not revealed to the
adversary thus allowing for information theoretic constructions.
Later, Ben-David and Sattath BS17 proved that relative to a classical oracle, but queried in superposition, there is a signature scheme where the adversary is also given access to the verification key.
Zhandry Zha19 proved that using indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions it is possible to obfuscate safely this oracle. To be precise, Zhandry proved that public-key quantum money
exist under the same assumptions but his result can also be applied to the construction of Ben-David
and Sattath.
Back to the private key setting, Brakersky et al. BCM

+ 18

showed that, under the learning-with-

errors assumption, there is a way to sample a pair (crs, td), in such a way that crs can be used to
sample a classical public key together with an unclonable quantum singing key. Using the trapdoor
td and the public key one can verify the validity of a signature. However, security is compromised
once the trapdoor is leaked.
Unclonable Ciphertexts.

The idea of encrypting messages into quantum states that offer

additional security than classical encryption was introduced by Gottesman Got02 , where he designed
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an encryption scheme such that if the eavesdropper tried to retrieve information out of it then the
receiver would detect it. Recently, Broadbent and Lord BL19 extended the above idea to a more natural definition of unclonable ciphertexts: an adversary who does not know the secret key cannot split
the quantum ciphertext into two states such that both decrypt correctly. They even gave a stronger
indistinguishability definition. Here, we prove that such a scheme is sufficient to construct selectively secure single-decryptor encryption and vice-versa. In the same context, Unruh Unr15 created
a time-released encryption scheme with revocation. In that setting, a message is encrypted into a
quantum state that needs time t to be decrypted. Moreover, the sender of the ciphertext can ask
from the receiver to send the ciphertext back if less than time t has passed. If this is the case, the
sender can verify that this ciphertext has not been decrypted. Our work can be seen as a modification of Unruh’s scheme in two ways. First, in our setting the ciphertext is classical and only the
decryption key is quantum. Second, the proof of revocation is also classical.

1.5

A Philosophical Note: Travelling over the Phone

In his famous book “The Emperor’s New Mind” Pen89 , Roger Penrose claims that consciousness
cannot be described by a purely classical deterministic or randomized algorithm but, instead, exhibits quantum capabilities. Respecting the postulates of quantum physics, one would never manage to clone a brain, simply because quantum mechanics prevent it. Nonetheless, hopefully in the
future we will be able to travel in the speed of light via a quantum channel.
I see the results of this thesis as an extension of this conjecture where any living being hides an
unclonable quantum state which can participate in a classical protocol to travel over the phone.
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Is it just me, or is it getting crazier out there?
Arthur Fleck, Joker

2

Preliminaries

2.1

Notation.

A function f is called negligible if f(n) = o(n−c ) for any constant c. We say that an event happens
with overwhelming probability if it happens with probability at least 1 − ε(n), where ε is a negligible
function. For a set S, we denote by x ← S, the random variable drawn uniformly at random from
S. Similarly, for a distribution D, we denote by x ← D the random variable sampled according
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to D. We use standard math font for classical variables and classical algorithms (e.g., sk or Alg) and
calligraphic font for quantum variables and quantum algorithms (e.g., sk or Alg ).
Entanglement of Adversarially Chosen States.

Unless stated otherwise, in the follow-

ing, we implicitly assume that adversarially chosen quantum states (s0 , s1 ) ← A can potentially be
entangled with a larger system.

2.2

Deterministic Computations

In the remaining of the paper we will make implicit use of the fact that a deterministic quantum
computation can always be rewound. Intuitively, this lemma says that if a measurement returns a
specific outcome with probability 1, then the measured state remains the same or in other words
it collapses to exactly the same state. This should not come as a surprise. Indeed if we measure the
state |1⟩ in the basis {|0⟩ , |1⟩}, then we get |1⟩ with probability 1 and the state remains |1⟩. This
lemma is known in the quantum literature in different names such as the information-disturbance
trade-off, the gentle measurement lemma Win99 or the almost-as-good-as-new lemma Aar09 . It will
allow us to use a decryption key to decrypt a message and then rewind to retrieve a key whose distance from the original key is negligible. Since by correctness of an encryption scheme, a decryption
process succeeds with overwhelming probability, we can always rewind and get the original key. We
thus omit the output of a new decryption key from the interface of a decryption algorithm.

2.3

Common Reference String Model

As is the case with quantum lightning Zha19 , a common reference string is necessary for most primitives we describe in this work. This is for the same reason we require a common reference string in
collision resistant hash functions: for a fixed function there is always an adversary that knows a col-
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lision. In the definitions below we assume that this common string is drawn uniformly at random.
This is the ideal scenario and does not require any public parameters generator. In some cases, for
example when the common reference string describes an obfuscated algorithm, a parameters generator may be necessary. In this case, this generator may hide a secret trapdoor which it destroys after
publishing the common reference string.

2.4

Quantum Tokens for Digital Signatures

The notion of quantum tokens for digital signatures was initiated by Ben-David and Sattath BS17 .
They also devised a construction relative to a classical oracle, but query-able in superposition.
Definition 1 (Quantum Tokens for Digital Signatures BS17 ). A quantum token for digital signatures
is a tuple of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver) with the following interface:
• Gen(1n ) : (pk, sk ) takes a security parameter n in unary and returns a classical public key pk
and a quantum secret key sk .
• Sign(sk , m) : σ takes quantum secret key sk and a message m and returns a signatures σ.
• Ver(pk, m, σ) : b takes a public key, a message and a signature and returns a bit b.
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability over the randomness of the

algorithms. If (pk, sk ) ← Gen(1n ) then for any message m, Ver(pk, m, Sign(sk , m)) = 1.
Security.

For any adversary A there is a negligible function ε such that

 Ver(pk, m0 , σ0 ) = 1
Pr 
Ver(pk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

(pk, sk ) ←

Gen(1n )

(m0 ̸= m1 , σ0 , σ1 ) ← A(pk, sk )
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 ≤ ε(n).

One-shot signatures imply quantum tokens for digital signatures by incorporating the random
crs as part of the public key.

2.5

Privately Verifiable One-shot Signatures

Consider a version of one-shot signatures where the common reference string crs is not a uniformly
random string of size n but instead it is created by a ParGen algorithm together with its trapdoor td.
The crs is enough to create (pk, sk ) pairs; however the verification of a signature requires also access
to the trapdoor td. We will call such a primitive, a privately verifiable one-shot signature. Formally,
we have:
Definition 2 (Privately verifiable one-shot signatures BCM

+ 18

). A privately veriﬁable one-shot signa-

ture is a quadruple of algorithms (ParGen, Gen, Sign, Ver) with the following syntax:
• ParGen(1n ) : (crs, td) takes an integer n in unary and returns a common reference string crs
together with a trapdoor td.
• Gen(crs) : (pk, sk ) takes a common reference string crs and returns a public key pk and a
secret key sk .
• Sign(sk , m) : σ takes a quantum secret key sk and a message m and returns a signature σ.
• Ver(td, pk, m, σ) : b takes a trapdoor td, a message m and a signature σ and returns a bit b.
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability. If (crs, td) ← ParGen(1n )

and (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs) then Ver(td, pk, m, Sign(sk , m)) = 1.
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Security.

For any quantum polynomial time algorithm A there is a negligible function ε such that


 Ver(td, pk, m0 , σ0 ) = 1
Pr 
Ver(td, pk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1
Brakersky et al. BCM

+ 18

(crs, td) ←

ParGen(1n )

(pk, {(m0 , σ0 ), (m1 , σ1 )}) ← A(crs)



 ≤ ε(n)

have shown that such one-shot signatures exist under the LWE assump-

tion and they used them to create privately verifiable protocols for quantumness and min-entropy.
In fact, similarly to our construction, as a first step they design a form of privately verifiable equivocal hash functions which they call trapdoor claw-free functions with efficient superposition.
Theorem 1 ( BCM

+ 18

). Privately veriﬁable one-shot signatures, proofs of quantumness and proofs of

min-entropy exist if the LWE assumption holds.
Radian and Sattath RS19 have shown that privately verifiable one-shot signatures are enough to
create semi-quantum money. This is a version of private key quantum money where the bank is
classical and verification of a coin requires only classical communication with the bank. The construction works as follows. The bank publishes a crs and keeps its td. In order to create a new coin,
a user generates (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs) and sends pk to the bank who signs it. To verify a coin, the
bank sends a random message m to the user who then uses sk to generate a signature σ. Finally the
bank uses td to verify that σ is valid.

2.6

Quantum Retrieval Games

Here we define an even weaker notion than disposable message authentication codes and privately
verifiable one-shot signatures, that of quantum retrieval games. Informally, a quantum retrieval
game (QRG) is a token for digital signature where in the security definition, the adversary does not
even have access to the verification key vk. Although this notion is weaker it enjoys the desired prop-
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erty that the quantum keys do not have to be highly entangled. Formally, we have the following
definition:
Definition 3 (Quantum Retrieval Games). The syntax and the correctness are identical to those of
tokens for signatures. Security is modiﬁed as follows:
Security.

For any (not necessarily quantum) quantum algorithm A, there is a negligible function

ε such that

 Ver(vk, m0 , σ0 ) = 1
Pr 
Ver(vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

(vk, sk ) ←

Gen(1n )

({(m0 , σ0 ), (m1 , σ1 )}) ← A(sk )



 ≤ ε(n).

Here we stress that we do not restrict the computational power of the adversary. Compare this
with all the previous definitions where the adversary either is necessarily restricted to be polynomial
time, or to have polynomially many queries in the case of tokens for signatures.
We now give a construction due to Gavinsky Gav12 that is based on the hidden matching problem
defined by Bar-Yossef et al. BYJK04 , and we include its security analysis.
Definition 4 (Hidden Matching, slightly informal). The hidden matching quantum retrieval game
is deﬁned as follows:
• Gen: Sample pk ← {0, 1}4 and sk =

1
2

P

pki
i∈{0,1}2 (−1)

|i⟩ and return (pk, sk ).

n
o
• Sign(sk , b) : If b = 0 measure sk in the basis √12 (|1⟩ ± |2⟩), √12 (|3⟩ ± |4⟩) , otherwise
n
o
measure in √12 (|1⟩ ± |3⟩), √12 (|2⟩ ± |4⟩) and return the result.
• Ver(pk, b, σ) : For the matching deﬁned by b, verify that the parity of the edge deﬁned by the
ﬁrst bit of σ equals the second bit of σ.
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Intuitively, for a key pk = x1 x2 x3 x4 and its corresponding quantum state, given a matching of
the form “x1 x2 , x3 x4 ” or “x1 x3 , x2 x4 ”, one can find the parity of one of its edges, but cannot do the
same for both matchings. Thus, the matching corresponds to the bit to be signed. Then the first bit
of the signature defines the edge of the matching and the second bit the parity of that edge.
It is easy to verify correctness. Indeed the two bases have orthogonal vectors and thus they are
valid measurements.
Theorem 2 (Security PYJ

+ 12

). Let ρ be the mixed state of the secret key and let ρpk = ppk |sk ⟩⟨sk | be

the unormalized density matrix. Moreover, for signatures σ0 , σ1 , let

Oσ0 ,σ1 = ρ−1/2 

X


ρpk  ρ−1/2 ,

pk:Ver(pk,0,σ0 )=Ver(pk,0,σ1 )=1

if ρ is invertible. Then, the maximum probability of ﬁnding a valid signature for both bits equals
maxσ0 ,σ1 ∥Oσ0 ,σ1 ∥, where ∥O∥ is the maximum eigenvalue of O.
The advantage of the above theorem is that one does not need to maximize over all possible
POVMs in order to find the best winning probability. One has to just compute the values ∥Oσ0 ,σ1 ∥
and maximize over them.
By invoking the above theorem, it is fairly straightforward to find the maximum winning probability.
Theorem 3 ( Gav12,PYJ

+ 12

). The maximum winning probability of the hidden matching quantum

retrieval game is 3/4.
Moreover, it is easy to see that a disposable message authentication code is also a quantum retrieval game. Indeed if one could sign two messages without use of a verification oracle, then the
same adversary can sign messages with access to a verification oracle; by just ignoring it. The opposite direction does not necessarily hold.
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Theorem 4. Quantum retrieval games exist if disposable message authentication codes exist.
Hardness amplification.

By running n independent times the above construction we can

guarantee that any adversary has negligible probability of finding two signatures. In more detail, in
order to sign the bit b one has to find a signature for b for all individual games. As with most parallel
repetition theorems in quantum information, we need to pay special attention on the analysis: we
cannot simply argue that independence of the secret keys implies a winning probability that equals
the product of the winning probabilities of the individual games. Moreover, the straightforward
“plug-and-pray” reduction where we plug our challenge instance into a list of independently sampled instances and then handing them to the adversary cannot give us a better that non-negligible
advantage. Instead, the approach followed is the following. It is sufficient to prove that the norm
of the operator O for the tensor product of several independent samples equals the product of the
norms of the individual games. The full proof appears in PYJ

+ 12

.

For longer messages, we can simply have an individual quantum retrieval games for each of its
bits. In this case, is it easy to show that a simple “plug-and-pray” reduction works.

2.7

Witness Encryption

Here we include the definition of witness encryption defined by Garg et al. GGSW13 . Additionally
to the standard security notion that requires indistinguishability of encryptions with respect to
instances not in the language, we also present a stronger version, that of extractable security, first
conceived by Goldwasser et al. GKP

+ 13

.

Definition 5 (Witness Encryption GGSW13 ). A witness encryption for an NP language L, is a pair of
algorithms (Enc, Dec) with the following interface:

25

• Enc(1n , x, M) : c takes a security parameter n in unary, an instance x and a message m and
outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec(c, w) : m takes a ciphertext c and a witness w and outputs a message m.
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability over the randomness of the

algorithms Enc, Dec. For any (x, w) ∈ RL and any message m, it holds that
Dec(Enc(1n , x, m), w) = m.
Security.

For any instance x ∈
/ L and any two messages m0 , m1 , it holds that
Enc(1n , x, m0 ) ∼c Enc(1n , x, m1 ).

Extractable Security GKP

+ 13

.

For any quantum polynomial time adversary A, polynomial p

and messages m0 , m1 , there is a quantum polynomial time extractor E and polynomial q such that for
any mixed state aux potentially entangled with an external register, if
|Pr[A(aux , Enc(1n , x, m0 )) = 1] − Pr[A(aux , Enc(1n , x, m1 )) = 1]| ≥
then
Pr[(x, E(1n , x, aux )) ∈ RL ] ≥
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1
.
q(n)

1
p(n)

Whatever you end up doing, love it. The way you loved
the projection booth when you were a little squirt.
Alfredo, Cinema Paradiso

3

One-Shot Signatures and Applications

3.1

Overview

In this chapter, we explore applications where local quantum operations yield surprising new protocols with classical communication. Our central building blocks will be one-shot signatures and
one-shot chameleon hash functions. Our results are as follows:
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One-shot signatures and one-shot chameleon hashing (Sections 3.2,3.3,3.4).

As

our first contribution, we give formal definitions for one-shot signatures and one-shot chameleon
hashing.
We also construct one-shot chameleon hashing, and hence one-shot signatures. We observe that
prior work essentially constructs this object ARU14 , but only relative to a quantum oracle* , and there
is no known way to instantiate the oracle. We improve on this by demonstrating a classical oracle
(but query-able in superposition) relative to which we can build one-shot chameleon hashing and
signatures. Even finding a plausible classical oracle to build one-shot chameleon hashing exists is
highly non-trivial. Our main idea is to start from a hash function which is periodic. Such a function
is certainly not collision resistant against quantum attacks due to quantum period finding, but at
least it is straightforward to show that it gives rise to the chameleon property we need. We then recursively divide the set of pre-images of each output into another periodic function. Importantly,
we choose different periods for each set of pre-images to avoid the overall function becoming periodic. In fact, we perform this recursive division several times, each time using a different period
for each set of pre-images. We demonstrate that this recursive structure nevertheless preserves the
chameleon property. We prove that our one-shot chameleon hashing is collision resistant relative
to this oracle using a modification of the polynomial method. Our classical oracle can then heuristically be obfuscated using post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation (e.g. BGMZ18 ) to yield a
plausible construction in the common reference string model.
Signature delegation.

We then turn to applications. Many of our applications can be seen as

applications of our signature delegation mechanism above. We demonstrate that our signature delegation protocol works, and can easily be delegated multiple times, with Bob delegating to Charlie,
who delegates to Dana, etc. The overall signature is the entire signature chain from Alice to the final
* That is, an oracle which performs a quantum operation on its input state
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signer.
Budget Signatures (Section 3.4).

We can also delegate to pairs of public keys. Such delega-

tion allows us, for example, to construct budget signatures. Here, when signing a message, we specify
a budget b > 0. Each public key will come with a total budget B, and the security property is that
Bob can sign any number of messages, so long as the total budget remains less than B.
In our scheme, the public key for a total budget B will simply be the pair (pk, B) where pk is the
public key for a one-shot signature. To sign a message m with budget b at most the total budget B,
simply sign m using the one-shot secret key, using up the secret key. Alternatively, one can delegate
to two budget signature public keys pk0 , pk1 with budgets B0 , B1 respectively, where B0 + B1 ≤
B. To do so, simply sign the concatenation of the two public keys. Those budget signatures can
then be recursively used to sign with budgets B0 , B1 . When verifying the signature relative to pk0 ,
additionally verify the signature on pk0 , pk1 relative to pk, as well as that B0 + B1 ≤ B. Since
we know pk0 can only sign with budget up to B0 and pk1 can only sign with budget up to B1 , this
verification guarantees pk can only sign with budget total budget up to B0 + B1 ≤ B. In typical
usage, we imagine that to sign a message with budget b, we will first invoke this delegation with
B0 = b and B1 = B − b, and then sign m with respect to pk0 , using the secret key in the process.
Further messages are signed with respect to pk1 .
Remark 2. We note that with our delegation scheme, the size of signatures grows with the depth of the
delegation. For our budget signatures, this is potentially problematic if large numbers of messages, and
hence delegations, are expected, as it implies a large secret key and signature size. Similar limitations
hold for many of our protocols below based on our delegation mechanism. In this work, we will for the
most part ignore this issue. However, we observe that by using a (post-quantum) succinct non-interactive
argument of knowledge (SNARK) (e.g. COS19 ), one can prove knowledge of the long signature chain
using a short digest. This allows our budget signature scheme to have short signatures. Of course, in or-
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der to generate the SNARK, one must remember the signature chain, and therefore the secret key must
still be large. By using a recursively composable SNARK, which allows for proving statements that include the SNARK veriﬁer, we can also compress the secret key of our scheme, by only ever remembering
a SNARK of the signature chain. We note that it is common to conjecture that SNARKs can be recursively composed for a polynomial number of times BSCTV14,Lab17 , and a similar idea has been used to
build cryptocurrency with a constant-sized blockchain Lab17 . Recursively composable SNARKs can also
be used in our other delegation-based protocols to compress key/signature sizes.
Quantum money with classical communication (Section 3.5).

One-shot signatures

readily yield public key quantum money, where the mint has a public key that allows anyone to
verify. Basically, the quantum signing key |sk⟩ for a one-shot signature serves as the quantum money
state.
Using our signature delegation mechanism, we show how to send quantum money using only
classical messages. The mint’s public key will be the public key for a classical post-quantum signature scheme. To mint a banknote with value V, the mint simply creates a secret key/public key pair
(|sk⟩ , pk) for a one-shot signature scheme, and signs the pair (pk, V) using it’s classical signature
scheme to get signature σ. Sending the note to someone simply invokes our delegation procedure.
By combining with our budget signatures, our quantum money scheme is also infinitely divisible,
unlike existing constructions.
Decentralized blockchain-less cryptocurrency (Section 3.5.4).

One-shot signatures

also immediately give rise to quantum lightning, yielding the first construction with provable security relative to a classical oracle. As explained by Zhandry Zha19 , by combining with a suitable proof
of work, quantum lightning gives a decentralized cryptocurrency, where the double-spend problem is solved using no-cloning as opposed to a blockchain. Zhandry’s scheme, however, requires
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quantum communication.
We combine our delegation scheme with proofs of work to give blockchain-less cryptocurrency
using only classical communication. The basic idea is that, to mint a new note, the miner generates
a secret key/public key pair for a one-shot signature scheme. Then the miner uses the public key as
the challenge in a proof of work. The completed proof of work and the key pair constitute the note.
Spending the note just involves our delegation mechanism, except that for the first transaction, the
miner appends the proof of work to the message he signs.
Ordered Signatures (Section 3.6).

Here, when signing a message, one also specifies a tag t.

The signing key allows for signing any message, but the requirement is that messages can only be
signed in order of increasing t. That is, once a message is signed at tag t0 , it then becomes impossible
to sign a message at a “past” tag t1 < t0 .
Our construction is very simple: the public key will be the public key for a one-shot signature
scheme. To sign a message at tag t, simply construct a new one-shot signature public key/secret key
pair (pk, |sk⟩), and delegate to the new public key. When signing to delegate, sign the entire public
key/tag/message triple. |sk⟩ becomes the new secret key, and the signature consists of the entire
signature chain from the original public key to the latest public key. To verify, simply verify the
signature chain, as well as verify that the tags in the chain occur in increasing order. The idea is that,
by the one-shot security of our signatures, the only way to produce a new signature is to append to
the signature chain. Therefore, once an adversary produces a signature at tag t0 , he has committed to
all the signatures he will produce at tags t1 < t0 . If he tries to sign a different message at t1 , this will
constitute a fork in the chain, violating the one-shot security property.
Ordered signatures allow one to provably destroy their signing key by signing a dummy message
at time ∞. Or one can at provably update their key by dividing time into epochs, and signing a
dummy message at the end of an epoch to update to the next epoch.
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As a toy application, we imagine priority for patent applications could be based on documentation of the invention, signed by the inventor with a timestamp. Alice wants to share her invention
with Bob, but is worried that Bob will try to pass off the invention as his own. With classical signatures, there is nothing preventing an unscrupulous Bob from creating phony documentation after
his conversation with Alice, and then backdating to make it appear that he invented first. With ordered signatures, however, Alice can insist that Bob first send her a signed message at the current
time t. By the ordered signature property, she is guaranteed that Bob cannot backdate any phony
documentation to before time t, therefore guaranteeing her priority.
Single-signer Signatures (Section 3.6.2).

Here, the secret key is subject to quantum no-

cloning, meaning that at any time, only a single user is capable of signing with respect to a given
public key. Our ordered signatures readily give such single-signer signatures, by simply having the
tag t be a counter, incremented with each signature. Security is proved as follows: toward contradiction, if one could split a secret key into two states such that each state is independently capable of
signing, then it is impossible to guarantee any order between the signatures produced by each state,
breaking the underlying ordered signature.
Of course, this signing capability can be transferred by sending over the quantum secret key;
our signatures can also easily be transferred with only classical communication, again using our
delegation mechanism.
We observe that single-signer signatures can be seen as yet a further strengthening of quantum
no-cloning. Whereas one-shot signatures endow the unclonable state with the functionality of signing message, the functionality can only be used a single time before the state self-destructs. Singlesigner signatures instead give the unclonable state the perpetual ability to sign an unlimited number
of messages, but this ability cannot be split amongst two parties.
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Delay Signatures (Section 3.6.3).

Adding proofs of sequential work (PoSW) to our ordered

signature construction, we obtain what we call delay signatures, where the signer must wait a certain
amount of time between signing messages.
As a potential application we imagine combining delay signatures with our quantum money
scheme. The result is that the mint can only mint new currency at a certain rate. This would prevent
an untrusted government from paying debts by simply minting unlimited money.
Proofs of quantumness (Section 3.7.1).

One-shot signatures easily give rise to a proof of

quantumness: to prove quantumness, generate a public key for a one-shot signature scheme, and
send it to the verifier. The verifier then chooses and sends back a random message. Respond with
a signature on the message. A simple rewinding argument shows that any classical adversary that
passes verification can be used to sign two messages with respect to the same public key, violating
one-shot security.
Interestingly, our proofs of quantumness are public coin, meaning soundness holds even if the
verifier’s random coins are public. Such protocols can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic. Prior protocols BCM

+ 18

are interactive and secret coin, and there is no obvious way to turn

them into non-interactive protocols.
Certifiable Randomness (Section 3.7.2).

Our proofs of quantumness give rise certifiable

min-entropy, which is again public coin and can be made non-interactive with Fiat-Shamir. Again,
prior protocols required multiple rounds. Though the prior protocols are able to achieve (statistically close to) uniform randomness. As explained by Zhandry Zha19 , any non-interactive protocol
can never achieve uniform randomness. Our protocol achieves super-logarithmic min-entropy.
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3.2

Equivocal Collision Resistant Hash Functions

In this section we define the new notion of equivocal collision-resistant hash functions and we give a
construction relative to a classical oracle.
Definition 6 (Equivocal Hash-Functions). An equivocal hash function family is a triple of algorithms (Gen, Eval, Equiv) with the following syntax:
• Gen(crs) : (h, sk , p) takes as input a common reference string crs and returns a hash value h,
a quantum secret key sk and a description of a predicate p.
• Eval(crs, x) : h takes as input a crs and a pre-image x and outputs a hash value h.
• Equiv(sk , b) : x takes as input a quantum secret key sk and a bit b and returns a pre-image x.
Correctness requires that the following holds with overwhelming probability. If (h, sk , p) ← Gen(crs)
then for any bit b, it holds that Eval(crs, x) = h and p(x) = b, where x ← Equiv(sk , b).
The above definition states that a quantum algorithm (Gen, Equiv) can sample an image h, a
secret “inversion” quantum key sk as well as a predicate p as a polynomial size circuit, and later on,
given any bit b, it can use this key to find a pre-image x of h such that p(x) = b. It is important to
notice that if we also require collision resistance, then quantumness is necessary. If the secret key
were classical, then by running Equiv twice with b = 0 and b = 1 we could find a collision. In the
quantum case, running Equiv can make sk collapse and thus impossible to reuse.
Theorem 5. There exists an equivocal collision resistant hash function relative to a classical oracle.
In section 3.2.1 we define our scheme relative to a classical oracle. In sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 we
prove the collision resistant and the equivocal property respectively.
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Levels of Security of Hash Functions.

Here we aim to compare different notions of se-

curity of hash functions. We study the following three definitions of a hash function H in order of
increasing security:
1. Collision resistant: no efficient adversary can come up with x0 , x1 such that H(x0 ) = H(x1 ).
2. Unequivocal: no efficient adversary can come up with an image h and a predicate p and later
on, given a bit b, find a pre-image x such that H(x) = h and p(x) = b.
3. Collapsing: no efficient adversary can distinguish the following oracles:
P
P
• MeasureOutput ( x ax |x⟩): Given the quantum state x ax |x⟩ apply H on superP
position to get the state x ax |x⟩ |H(x)⟩. Then measure the second register to get
P
ψ0 ∝ x:H(x)=h ax |x⟩ |y⟩ and return ψ0 .
P
P
• MeasureInput ( x ax |x⟩): Given the quantum state x ax |x⟩, measure it to get a
random x and return ψ1 = |x⟩ |H(x)⟩.
It is easy to see that (3) implies (2) and (2) implies (1). Indeed, if one is able to find a collision x, x′
such that xi ̸= x′i for some i, then by picking the predicate p(x) = xi , one can break the unequivocal
property. Moreover, if one can find an image h that later they can invert at will, then it can distinguish ψ0 from ψ1 , since ψ1 = |x⟩ |H(x)⟩ already fixes a pre-image x such that p(x) = b and
thus cannot be used to find x′ such that p(x′ ) = 1 − b.
Zhandry Zha19 shows that a hash function that is (1) but not (3) gives quantum lightning. Here,
we show that a hash function that is (1) but not (2) has even more applications.
In the process of coming up with an equivocal collision resistant hash function in the plain
model, we note that it is enough to come up with a function that breaks the unequivocal property
with an inverse polynomial probability. Given such a function H, we can easily boost to high success probability by running it independently n times. In particular, the function Hn (x1 , . . . , xn ) =
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(H(x1 ), . . . , H(xn )) is equivocal according to our definition. Let A be an adversary that breaks
property (2). By running n times A we get values h1 , . . . , hn and predicates p1 , . . . , pn . We define
our predicate p(x1 , . . . , xn ) as the majority of pi (xi ). To equivocate to a bit b, we simply equivocate
each individual hash to b. By invoking the Chernoff bound and choosing n large enough, we are
guaranteed that we get a pre-image x = x1 , . . . , xn such that p(x) = b with overwhelming probability.
An interesting question that arises is whether (2) implies (3); namely, can we use a distinguisher
against the collapsing property to build an inverter that equivocates? Although searching solutions
looks like a harder task than just distinguishing two different states, the above implications are not
excluded.

3.2.1 Construction relative to a classical oracle
In this section we define our function family relative to a classical oracle. The oracle is a combination of two oracles H, H⊥ where H is the evaluation oracle and H⊥ is used to achieve equivocality.
In our construction, the space of n-bit inputs is partitioned into 2n/2 affine spaces of dimension
n/2. The oracle H assigns a distinct output to each space. Applying H to a uniform superposition and measuring yields a uniform superposition over one of the affine subspaces. To achieve the
equivocal property, a second oracle H⊥ is be provided, which tests for membership in the spaces
orthogonal to the affine spaces in H.
Before defining our construction we introduce some terminology. For the n-dimensional space
Fn2 , a d-ordered affine partition P = (Ay )y∈{0,1}n−d is a list of 2n−d pairwise disjoint affine subspaces
of dimension d. For an affine subspace A, we denote A⊥ the orthogonal complement of the linear
subspace corresponding to A.
Definition 7 (Affine partition function). Let P = (Ay )y∈{0,1}n/2 be an n/2-ordered aﬃne partition.
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An aﬃne partition function (HP , H⊥
P ) is deﬁned as:
• HP : Fn2 → {0, 1}n/2 such that HP (x) = y if and only if x ∈ Ay ,
n
n/2 → {0, 1} such that H⊥ (x, y) = 1 if and only if x ∈ A⊥ .
• H⊥
y
P : F2 × {0, 1}
P

In other words, our function is parameterized by an ordered partition of the n-dimensional input
space into affine subpsaces, each containing 2n/2 points such that all points in the same subspace Ay
map to the same value y. Our claim is that there exists an affine partition that requires exponentially
many queries to find a collision.
Theorem 6. There is an aﬃne ordered partition P = (Ay )y∈{0,1}n/2 such that HP is an equivocal
collision resistant hash function relative to the oracle (HP , H⊥
P ).
Notice that the above theorem claims worst-case hardness. We prove the two parts of this theorem in the following two subsections. In subsection 3.2.2 we prove our query complexity lower
bound for collisions and in subsection 3.2.3 we prove equivocality.

3.2.2 Collision Resistance
Our collision resistance lower bound is based on a modification of the inner-product adversary
method Amb02,AC12 and follows the lines of BS17 . We devise a relation between hard-to-distinguish
partitions and we prove that any algorithm that finds a collision must end up in states such that their
average inner product (over the relation) is a constant away from 1. The relation is picked in such a
way that the average inner product cannot decrease by more than an exponentially small amount in
each query.
We will use the following generalization of Ambainis’s Amb02 basic adversary method. It combines
the inner product adversary method by Aaronson and Christiano AC12 with Lemma 18 by BenDavid and Sattath BS17 .
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Theorem 7 (Adversary method for search problems). Let S ⊂ {0, 1}N be a set of inputs of size N,
p : S → T be a search problem and let R ⊂ S × S be a symmetric relation between inputs. For any
x ∈ S, let Rx = {y ∈ S : (x, y) ∈ R}. If
1. (Hard-to-distinguish (x, y) pairs). For every x appearing in R and every i such that xi = 0,
Pry←Rx [yi = 1] ≤ ε,
2. (Distinguishing solutions s). For every x appearing in R and every s such that s ∈ p(x),
Pry←Rx [s ∈ p(y)] ≤ c,
then any quantum algorithm that solves p with an inverse polynomial in log N probability must make
 √ 
at least Ω 1−√εc−d queries to the input, where d ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Consider an input x ∈ {0, 1}N and suppose that an algorithm A makes T queries; i.e., A =
UT Ox UT−1 Ox · · · U1 Ox U0 , where U1 , . . . , UT are arbitrary unitary transformations independent of
x and Ox |i⟩ = (−1)xi |i⟩. Let φxt , ψxt be the states of the algorithm before after the t’th query to
Ox . In the beginning ψx1 is the same for all x since A has not made any query to Ox . The final state
of the algorithm is φxT .
Consider the progress measure pt = E(x,y)←R



y

φxt φt



and observe that p1 = 1. We will prove

that condition 1 implies that a single query cannot decrease the progress measure too much and
condition 2 implies that anyone that finds a solution with good probability after T queries should
end up having a progress pT at least a constant less than 1.
√
We begin by proving that pt−1 −pt ≤ 4 ε. The proof in a more general setting, where the oracles
can be reflections across subspaces, first appeared in AC12 but we include it here for completeness.
Write
φxt =

X
i∈[N]

αxt,i |i⟩ φxt,i
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E

where

P

i∈[N]

αxt,i

2

= 1 and notice that
y

φxt φt =

X
i∈[N]

D
E
y
y
αxt,i αt,i φxt,i φt,i .

After we query Ox our new state becomes
ψxt =

X
i:xi =0

E X
E
αxt,i |i⟩ φxt,i −
αxt,i |i⟩ φxt,i
i:xi =1

and thus
y

y

φxt φt − ψxt ψt = 2

X
i:xi ̸=yi

D
E
y
y
αxt,i αt,i φxt,i φt,i .

Moreover, by the triangle inequality, we have that
y

φxt φt

−

y

ψxt ψt

y

y

φxt φt − ψxt ψt
X
y
≤2
αxt,i αt,i
≤

i:xi ̸=yi

Lemma 1 (Small progress AC12 ). If for every x appearing in R and every i : xi = 0, Pry←Rx [yi =
√
1] ≤ ε, then pt−1 − pt ≤ 4 ε.
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Proof. By taking expectations, we get
pt−1 − pt =
≤



E

(x,y)←R



E

(x,y)←R

≤2

E

(x,y)←R

E



E

y

i:xi ̸=yi

i:xi =0,yi =1



E

i:xi =0,yi =1



p
= 2 1/ε max E 
x



y
αxt,i αt,i 

X



(x,y)←R





X



y

ψxt ψt

(x,y)←R

y

(x,y)←R

p
≤ 2 1/ε

−

φxt φt − ψxt ψt


X
y

αxt,i αt,i 


=4



y

φxt φt

y←Rx



αxt,i

√
2
+2 ε


E



(x,y)←R



X

i:xi =0,yi =1

√
2
αxt,i  + 2 ε max

(x,y)∈R

X

i:xi =0,yi =1

X
i:xi =0,yi =1


y 2
αt,i 

y 2

αt,i

p
√
≤ 2 1/ε max ε + 2 ε
√
= 4 ε,

x

where the 5th lines comes from Jensen’s inequality and the 8th line comes from the fact that

max E 
x

y←Rx

X

i:xi =0,yi =1


2
αxt,i  ≤ max

Pr [yi = 1] ≤ ε

x,i:xi =0 y←Rx

We continue by showing that any algorithm that finds a solution with constant probability
should achieve pT that is a constant away from 1. The following Lemma is a trivial generalization
of Lemma 18 by Ben-David and Sattath BS17 .
Lemma 2. Let R be a symmetric relation between inputs x ∈ {0, 1}N and let p : {0, 1}N →
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{0, 1}O(log N) be a search problem. Suppose that an algorithm computes p with probability at least 1 − d
after T queries. If maxx,s∈p(x) Pry←Rx [s ∈ p(y)] ≤ c, then
pT ≤

√

√
c + 2 d.

Proof. We decompose the final state of the algorithm φxT = |φx ⟩ into correct and wrong outputs:
|φx ⟩ = |Gx ⟩ + |Bx ⟩
where |Gx ⟩ =

P

x
s∈P(x) as

ψxs |s⟩ , |Bx ⟩ =

P

x
s̸∈P(x) as

ψxs |s⟩ and ||Bx ⟩| ≤

√

d.

The absolute value of the inner product between any two states corresponding to inputs x, y is
|⟨φx |φy ⟩| ≤ |⟨φx |Gy ⟩| +

√

d
√
≤ |⟨Gx |Gy ⟩| + d
X
√
y
≤
|axs | as + 2 d.
s∈P(x)∩P(y)

By the same analysis as above, we get

E

(x,y)←R



X


y
|axs | as  ≤ max

x,s∈P(x)

s∈P(x)∩P(y)

≤

√

(x,y)←R

[|⟨φx |φy ⟩|] ≤

Pr [s ∈ P(y)]

y←Rx

c,

and therefore that
E

r

√

√
c+2 d

By combining the above lemmata 1 and 2, we conclude that any algorithm that finds a solution
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with probability at least 1 − d, has to make at least Ω



√ 
√
1− c−2 d
√
queries to the input.
ε

It remains to show that any algorithm that succeeds with probability at least 1/p(n), where
n = log N, for some polynomial p, can be turned into an algorithm that succeeds with probability close to 1. Indeed, by running our algorithm p(n)q(n) times, where q(n) is a polynomial, we get
a winning probability of 1 − (1 − 1/p(n))p(n)q(n) ≈ 1 − e−q(n) which is exponentially close to 1. Notice that the repetition reduces the lower bound by a polynomial factor of p(n)q(n). This concludes
the proof of theorem 7.
Equipped with theorem 7, we can derive the first part of theorem 6; i.e., the existence of a partition that is collision resistant.
Theorem 8. There is an aﬃne ordered partition P = (Ay )y∈{0,1}n/2 such that HP is a collision
resistant hash function relative to the oracle (HP , H⊥
P ).
n

n

Proof. In our case, S = ΣF2 × {0, 1}F2 ×2

n/2

, where Σ = {0, 1}n/2 is the range of HP , T = Fn2 × Fn2

and the search problem is defined as col(HP , H⊥
P ) = {(a, b) : HP (a) = HP (b) ∧ a ̸= b}.
n/2 ,
⊥
Define the relation R such that ((HP , H⊥
P ), (HQ , HQ )) ∈ R if and only if for each y ∈ {0, 1}
Q

dim(APy ∩ Ay ) = n/2 − 1, where P = (APy )y∈{0,1}n/2 . Fix an image y and a point p ∈ APy . It holds
that
Pr

Q←RP

h

p∈

Q
Ay

Q

i
=

APy \Ay

Fn2 \APy

=

2n/2−1
1
≤ n/2
n/2
n
2 −2
2

Moreover, any collision p ̸= q ∈ APy forms a one-dimensional affine subspace C = {p, q} ≤ APy . We
Q

can see that the probability Prq←RP [C ≤ Ay ] equals to the probability that {0, q + p} belongs to the
Q

linear subspace Ay + p. We have that

Pr

Q←RP

h

Q

C ≤ Ay

i

h
i
Q
= Pr {0, p + q} ≤ Ay + p =
Q←RP
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n/2−1 
n/2−2 2
n/2 
n/2−1 2

=

2n/2−1 − 1
1
≤ ,
n/2
2
2 −1

where



n
k q

=

Qk−1

1−qn−i
i=0 1−qk−i

is the Gaussian binomial coefficient that counts the number of k-

dimensional linear subspaces in Fnq .


By invoking theorem 7 we get a collision lower bound of Ω 2n/4 .

3.2.3 Equivocality
In this subsection we prove the equivocal property. In short, Gen samples a uniform superposition
of pre-images of a random image y by evaluating the oracle on the superposition of all elements in
the domain and measuring the output register. Equiv runs a fixed-point Grover’s search using the
orthogonal oracle.
We define our algorithms Gen, Equiv as follows. Gen first prepares the uniform superposition
P
over all inputs |φ⟩ = 2−n/2 x∈Fn |x⟩. Subsequently, it evaluates the oracle to get the state |ψ⟩ =
2
P
P
2−n/2 x |x⟩ |HP (x)⟩ and finally measures the second register and gets Ay = 2−n/4 x∈Ay |x⟩ |y⟩
for a uniformly random y. Ay corresponds to the secret quantum key sk and y is the corresponding image. Now, given sk and any bit b, the goal of Equiv is to find a pre-image x ∈ Ay such that x1 ,
the first bit of x, equals b.
Of course, for such an algorithm to work correctly it should be the case that Ay contains both
x’s that start with 0 and x’s that start with 1. Since our complexity lower bound is for a worst case
partition, it could be the case that all x’s in the same affine subspace start with the same bit. To overcome this, we note that if (HP , H⊥
P ) is an affine partition function that is collision resistant, then
′
′
for any full-rank linear transformation f, the function (HP′ , H⊥
P′ ), where P = (Ay )y∈{0,1}n/2 and

A′y = {f(x) : x ∈ Ay } is also a collision resistant affine partition function. By applying a random
linear transformation f, we retrieve a random affine subspace A. As long as one of the basis vectors
in the corresponding linear subspace has 1 in its first coordinate, half of the elements in the linear
subpspace will start with 0. The probability that a random subspace does not have a vector starting
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with 1 is 2−n/2 since it has to be the case that none of the n/2 basis vectors starts with 1.
Theorem 9 (Equivocality). There is an aﬃne ordered partition P such that HP is an equivocal collision resistant hash function relative to the oracle (HP , H⊥
P ).
Proof. Fix a P such that HP is collision resistant and apply a random full-rank linear transformation
on it. It suffices to show that given Ay and y as well as access to the oracle H⊥
P , we can find an x
such that x ∈ Ay and x1 , the first bit of x, starts with the bit of our choice. Let Ay,b = {x ∈ Ay :
x1 = b} and notice that Ay,0 is an affine subspace parallel to Ay,1 . We first condition on Ay,0 =
Ay,1 since the probability of the event not happening is negligible. Our goal now is to run Grover’s
search algorithm in order to transform our state Ay into the state Ay,b .
We would like to implement the following two oracles:
1. Ob = 2

P

x:x1 =b |x⟩⟨x|

− I and


ED

⊥ − I F, where F is the quantum Fourier Transform
2. Uy = 2 Ay Ay − I = F 2 A⊥
A
y
y
over Fn2 which is equivalent to the n-qubit Hadamard gate.
The oracle Ob can be implemented locally by running on superposition a classical function that
accepts inputs that start with b and rejects otherwise. However, notice that in our case we do not
ED
⊥
have access to the quantum oracle 2 A⊥
A⊥
y
y − I but instead to the classical oracle HP (·, y) =
P
2 x∈A⊥
|x⟩⟨x| − I that accepts all vectors in the orthogonal subspace and not just their uniform
y
superposition. We claim that this oracle is enough to implement Grover’s algorithm. To see this,
notice that Grover’s algorithm runs on the 2-dimensional subspace spanned by Ay,0 , Ay,1 . It is
therefore, enough to implement an oracle that accepts the state |+⟩ = Ay =
and rejects the state |−⟩ =

√1 (
2

√1 (
2

Ay,0 + Ay,1 )

Ay,0 − Ay,1 ). Let Ay = Sy + t for some translation t. Moreover

let Ay,0 = Sy,0 + a and Ay,1 = Sy,0 + b such that a1 + b1 = 1 since both are translations of the same
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linear subpspace and their first bit differs. We have:
⊥
FH⊥
P (·, y)F |+⟩ = FHP (·, y)

=F

1
2n/4

X

1
2n/4

X

(−1)tx |x⟩

x∈A⊥
y

(−1)tx |x⟩

x∈A⊥
y

= |+⟩
and
1
⊥
FH⊥
P (·, y)F |−⟩ = FHP (·, y) √ (F Ay,0 − F Ay,1 )
2


X
1

X
(−1)xb |x⟩
= FH⊥
(−1)xa |x⟩ −
P (·, y) (n+3)/4 
2
⊥
⊥

= FH⊥
P (·, y)

1
2(n+3)/4

1
2(n+3)/4




X





=F

x∈Ay,0

⊥
x∈A⊥
y,0 \Ay

X

x∈Ay,0




(−1)x(a+b) |x⟩



−(−1)x(a+b) |x⟩

⊥
x∈A⊥
y,0 \Ay

= − |−⟩
Moreover, since we know the number of pre-images that start with the desired bit, we can calculate the exact number of iterations in order to find a correct solution with probability 1.

3.3

One-shot Chameleon Hash Functions

Before we define our notion of one-shot chameleon hash functions, we recall the original definition of chameleon hashing. A chameleon hash function consists of three classical algorithms
Gen, Eval, Inv such that Gen(1n ) : (pk, sk) takes a security parameter and outputs a public key
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pk and a secret key sk, Eval(pk, x, r) : h takes an input x, randomness r and a public key pk and
outputs a hash value h and Inv(sk, h, x) : r takes a secret trapdoor key sk, a hash value h and input x
and outputs randomness r such that Eval(x, r, pk) = h. The chameleon hash function is collision
resistant if for any polynomial time algorithm A, there is a negligible function ε such that


Pr Eval(pk, x0 , r0 ) = Eval(pk, x1 , r1 )

(pk, sk) ←

Gen(1n )

{(x0 , r0 ), (x1 , r1 )} ← A(pk)



 ≤ ε(n)

In our setting, we have the following modifications. First, we require a family of hash functions,
indexed by a common reference string crs. This is to deal with trivial adversaries that always know
a collision of a hash function. Second, we would like the image h to be sampled together with a
quantum inversion key sk , which can be used later, to find randomness r for any input x. Formally,
we have
Definition 8 (One-Shot Chameleon Hash Functions). A one-shot chameleon hash function is a tuple
of algorithms (Gen, Eval, Inv) with the following syntax:
• Gen(crs) : (h, sk ) takes as input a common reference string crs and outputs a hash value h
together with a quantum secret key sk ,
• Eval(crs, x, r) : h takes as input a common reference string crs, an input x and randomness r
and outputs a hash h,
• Inv(sk , x) : r takes as input a secret key sk and an x and outputs randomness r.
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability over crs and the randomness of

Gen and Inv. If (h, sk ) ← Gen(crs) then for any input x, we have Eval(crs, x, Inv(sk , x)) = h.
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Collision Resistance.

For any polynomial quantum adversary A, there is a negligible function

ε such that


Pr Eval(crs, x0 , r0 ) = Eval(crs, x1 , r1 )

crs ←

{0, 1}n

{(x0 , r0 ), (x1 , r1 )} ← A(crs)



 ≤ ε(n).

Theorem 10. One-shot chameleon hash functions exist if and only if equivocal collision-resistant hash
functions exist.
Proof. The only if part is straightforward by setting the input length |x| = 1 to be a single bit and
defining the predicate as p(x, r) = x. For the opposite direction, we first define our chameleon hash
function (Gen, Eval, Inv) for messages of one bit. Let (E.Gen, E.Eval, E.Equiv) be an equivocal
CRHF. Define
• Gen(crs): Run (h′ , sk , p) ← E.Gen(crs), set h = (h′ , p, 0) and return (h, sk ).
• Eval(crs, (p, b), r): Return (E.Eval(crs, r), p, p(r) ⊕ b)
• Inv(sk , (p, b)): Run r ← E.Equiv(sk , b) and return r
For correctness, we have that
Eval(crs, (p, b), Inv(sk , (p, b))) = Eval(crs, (p, b), E.Equiv(sk , b))
= Eval(crs, (p, b), r) such that p(r) = b
= (E.Eval(crs, r), p, p(r) ⊕ p(r))
= (h, p, 0) such that E.Eval(crs, r) = h.
Hence, correctness is implied by the correctness of the equivocal CRHF.
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For security, suppose there exists an algorithm A and non-negligible function e such that
Pr[A wins] = Pr[Eval(crs, (p0 , b0 ), r0 ) = Eval(crs, (p1 , b1 ), r1 )]
= Pr[(E.Eval(crs, r0 ), p0 , p0 (r0 ) ⊕ b0 ) = (E.Eval(crs, r1 ), p1 , p1 (r1 ) ⊕ b1 )]
= Pr[E.Eval(crs, r0 ) = E.Eval(crs, r1 ) ∧ r0 ̸= r1 ],
where the probability is over crs and {(p0 , b0 , r0 ), (p1 , b1 , r1 )} ← A(crs). Then an adversary
E.A(crs) who just runs {(p0 , b0 , r0 ), (p1 , b1 , r1 )} ← A(crs) and returns (r0 , r1 ) can also find a
collision in the equivocal hash function with probability e(n).
Using parallel repetition, we can get one-shot chameleon hash functions for longer messages.
k-shot Chameleon Hashing.

In the k-shot version, we can use our secret key sk to invert

a hash value, k but not k + 1 times. Formally, we require that the inversion algorithm outputs an
updated secret key sk ′ together with r.
Definition 9 (k-shot Chameleon Hash Functions). A k-shot chameleon hash function is a tuple of
algorithms (Gen, Eval, Inv) with the following syntax:
• Gen(crs) : (h, sk ) takes as input a common reference string crs and outputs a hash value h
together with a quantum secret key sk ,
• Eval(crs, x, r) : h takes as input a common reference string crs, an input x and randomness r
and outputs a hash h,
• Inv(h, sk , x) : (r, sk ′ ) takes as input an image h, a secret key sk and an x and outputs randomness r and an updated secret key sk ′ .
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability over crs and the randomness of

Gen and Inv. If (h, sk 0 ) ← Gen(crs) then for any k inputs x1 , . . . , xk , we have Eval(crs, xi , ri ) = h,
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where (ri , sk i ) ← Inv(h, sk i−1 , xi ).
(k + 1)-Collision Resistance.

For any polynomial quantum adversary A, there is a negligible

function ε such that


Pr ∀i ∈ [k + 1], Eval(crs, xi , ri ) = h

crs ←

{0, 1}n

(h, {(xi , ri )}i∈[k+1] ) ← A(crs)



 ≤ ε(n)

We can use one-shot chameleon hash functions to build k-shot ones. The idea is to use parallel
repetition and output k images. Then, to invert we pick at random one of them and we use the corresponding secret key to invert it. Continuing this way, we can invert all k of them until we exhaust
our secret keys.
Lemma 3. k-shot chameleon hash functions exist if and only if one-shot chameleon hash functions exist.
Proof. The only-if part is straightforward by taking k = 1. For the opposite direction, assume
(Gen ′ , Eval′ , Inv ′ ) is a one-shot chameleon hash function. We define our k-shot (Gen, Eval, Inv) as:
• Gen(crs): For i ∈ [k], run (hi , sk i ) ← Gen ′ (crs). Set h = {hi }i∈[k] , sk = (sk i )i∈[k] and
output (h, sk ).
• Eval(crs, x, r): Parse r = (r′ , h), where h is a set of k − 1 images. Set hi = Eval′ (crs, x, r′ )
and output h ∪ {hi }.
• Inv(h, sk , x): Parse sk = (sk i )i∈S . Pick a random j ← S and run r′ ← Inv ′ (sk j , x). Set
r = (r′ , h\{hj }), where hj = Eval′ (crs, x, r′ ) and sk ′ = (sk i )i∈S\{j} . Output (r, sk ′ ).
Correctness is straightforward from the correctness of the underlying one-shot chameleon hash
function. To argue security, suppose that there is an adversary A that returns (h, {(xi , ri )}i∈[k+1] )
such that Eval(crs, xi , ri ) = h for all i, where |h| = k. Let ri = (r′i , hi ) and notice that |hi ∩h| = k−
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1, for all i. By the pigeonhole principle, there exist i ̸= j, such that hi = hj and Eval′ (crs, xi , r′i ) =
Eval′ (crs, xj , r′j ) and thus the pair ((xi , r′i ), (xj , r′j )) is a collision to the one-shot chameleon hash
function.

3.3.1 Uniformity
In some cases it may be a desirable property from a one-shot chameleon hash function, to be hard to
distinguish between a uniform r and an r generated through the inversion algorithm. Formally, we
would like the following:
Definition 10 (Uniformity). For any input x, it holds that (Eval(crs, x, r), r) ≡ (h, Inv(sk , x)),
where crs, r are picked uniformly at random and (h, sk ) ← Gen(crs).
For our function to be uniform, we impose some additional sufficient properties from our
equivocal hash function. We require that E.Gen returns a uniformly random h in the range of the
function and always outputs a fixed predicate p that is satisfied with probability q, for a uniformly
random r. Moreover, E.Inv returns a uniformly random r such that p(r) = b. Theses properties, are satisfied by our construction, though it may not be the case in general. Such equivocal
hash-functions, where the predicate is fixed can be thought of as the one-shot version of claw-free
functions by Goldwasser et al. GMR84 . Now in the construction of chameleon hash functions from
equivocal hash functions, the Gen algorithm additionally picks a random bit b′ which is 1 with probability q and returns (h′ , p, b′ ) as the hash value. The inversion algorithm Inv(sk , (p, b)) returns
E.Equiv(sk , b ⊕ b′ ).

3.3.2 Signature Delegation
As illustrated in the introduction, one-shot signatures give rise to delegation of authentication
where Alice can delegate Bob to sign a single message. The main idea is to use the hash-then-sign
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paradigm BR96 where in our case, the hash will be a one-shot chameleon hash.
Let S′ = (Gen′ , Sign′ , Ver′ ) be a standard signature scheme with existential unforgeability under
chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) and let C = (Gen, Eval, Inv) be a one-shot chameleon hash
function. We define a signature scheme S = (Gen, Sign, Ver) as:
• Gen(1n ) : Run (pk, sk) ← Gen′ (1n ) and output (pk, sk).
• Sign(crs, sk, m) : Pick a random r and compute h ← Eval(crs, m, r) and σ ← Sign′ (sk, h).
Return (σ, r).
• Ver(crs, pk, m, (σ, r)) : Compute h ← Eval(crs, m, r) and return Ver′ (pk, h, σ).
It is easy to see that the correctness of S is implied by the correctness of S′ and C. Moreover, S is
EUF-CMA as long as S is also EUF-CMA and C is secure. Indeed if an adversary could create a new
signature after querying a signing oracle, then one could use this adversary to break either the oneshot chameleon hashing or the original signature S′ .
Delegation.

Now suppose that Alice, who owns a classical computer, possesses a key pair

(pk, sk) for S and she wishes to delegate Bob to sign a single message. To do this, Alice and Bob
run the following 2-message protocol.
• Bob runs (h, sk ) ← Gen(crs) and sends h to Alice.
• Alice runs σ ← Sign′ (sk, h) and sends σ to Bob.
Now Bob possesses a quantum key sk that he can use together with σ to sign any message m of
his choice. To do this, Bob runs r ← Inv(sk , m) and returns (σ, r) as the signature of m. By the
correctness of S′ and C we get that Bob’s signature is accepted by Ver. Moreover, if a malicious Bob
could come up with more than k signatures after running the above protocol k times, then he could
also break S or C.
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It is worth to note that here Alice does not need to have any quantum powers to sign a message.
It is only the delegation that requires quantumness and only Bob needs to be quantum. Moreover,
if C is uniform then we get the additional property that one cannot distinguish a signature created
by Alice from a signature created by Bob.
Chain of delegations.

Consider the scenario where Alice has delegated to Bob to sign k mes-

sages but Bob wishes to delegate l ≤ k of them to Charlie. Then Bob and Charlie can run in turn
the above protocol where now Bob will use his l secret keys to invert Charlie’s l hash values.
Several optimizations can be applied to the above protocol. Setting uniformity aside, a different
way for Alice to delegate Bob k signatures, would be to sign the message (k, h) where h is Bob’s hash
value in the above protocol. Now Bob can use a modification of the Naor-Yung paradigm NY89
for creating full-blown signatures out of one-time signatures as follows. He first runs (h′ , sk ′ ) ←
Gen(crs). Then, to sign a message m, he runs r ← Inv(sk , (m, h′ )) and the signature will now be
(σ, m, h). Iteratively, Bob can use sk ′ for a new message. To verify, one checks that all signatures in
the chain are valid and that the total length of the chain is at most k. Similarly, Bob can decide to
delegate to Charlie l ≤ k of his signatures using the same protocol.
Remark 3. A reader familiar with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin can see an immediate similarity between signature delegation and blockchains. Indeed, a chain of delegations can be seen as a
blockchain where each block contains a single signature and violating security implies a fork in this
chain. This similarity becomes more apparent in section 3.5, where we also show how one can create
quantum money using only classical communication as well as smart contracts.
Remark 4. A different name for the above construction would be blind signatures, hence addressing an open problem problem posed by Ben-David and Sattath BS17 . Moreover, we get the additional
property that Bob can decide later which message he wants to sign. Notice that in a classical world this
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would be impossible since Bob could use his signing key multiple times. Therefore, it is necessary in all
classical blind signature schemes that Bob commits to the message he wants to sign by masking it and
sending it to Alice for a signature.

3.4

One-shot Signatures and Budget Signatures

A one-shot signature scheme has the property that no one can create a public key together with two
valid signatures.
Definition 11 (One-Shot Signatures). A one-shot signature is a triplet of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver)
with the following syntax:
• Gen(crs) : (pk, sk ) takes a common reference string crs and outputs a classical public key pk
and a quantum secret key sk .
• Sign(sk , m) : σ takes a secret key sk and a message m and outputs a signature σ.
• Ver(crs, pk, m, σ) : b takes a common reference string crs, a public key pk, a message m and a
signature σ and outputs a bit b.
Correctness.

If (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs) then Ver(crs, pk, m, Sign(sk , m)) = 1 for any message

m with overwhelming probability.
Security.

For any quantum polynomial time algorithm A there is a negligible function ε such that


 Ver(crs, pk, m0 , σ0 ) = 1
Pr 
Ver(crs, pk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

crs ←

{0, 1}n

(pk, {(m0 , σ0 ), (m1 , σ1 )}) ← A(crs)

One-shot chameleon hashing gives a direct way to build one-shot signatures:
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 ≤ ε(n)

Theorem 11. One-shot signatures exist if one-shot chameleon hash functions exist.
Proof. Let (C.Gen, C.Eval, C.Inv) be a one-shot chameleon hash function. We define our signature
scheme (Gen, Sign, Ver) as follows. Gen(crs) runs (h, sk ) ← C.Gen(crs) and returns pk = h as
the public key and sk as the secret key. Sign(sk , m) runs r ← C.Inv(sk , m) and returns σ = r as
the signature. Ver(crs, pk, m, σ) runs h′ = C.Eval(crs, m, σ) and accepts only if h′ = pk. Correctness and security are implied immediately from the correctness and the security of the underlying
chameleon hash function.
One-shot signatures are a specific case of a more flexible notion which we call budget signatures.
In a budget signature scheme, a public key has an initial budget β and each signature has a cost c ≤
β. One can use their secret key to sign messages until the budget is exhausted. Security requires than
no adversary can come up with signatures whose total cost exceeds the budget.
Definition 12 (Budget Signatures). A budget signature is a tuple of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver)
with the following syntax:
• Gen(crs, β) : (pk, sk ) takes a common reference string crs and a budget β and outputs a classical public key pk with budget pk.budget and a quantum secret key sk with budget sk .budget.
• Sign(sk , m, c) : (sk ′ , σ) takes a secret key sk , a message m and a cost c > 0 and outputs an
updated secret key sk ′ and a signature σ.
• Ver(crs, pk, m, σ, c) : b takes a common reference string crs, a public key pk, a message m, a
signature σ and a cost c and outputs a bit b.
Correctness.

The following hold with overwhelming probability. If (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs, β),

then pk.budget = sk .budget = β. Moreover, if sk .budget ≥ c and (sk ′ , σ) ← Sign(sk , m, c) then
Ver(crs, pk, m, σ, c) = 1 and sk ′ .budget = sk .budget − c.
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Security.

For any quantum polynomial time algorithm A there is a negligible function ε such that


 ∀i, Ver(crs, pk, mi , σi , ci ) = 1
Pr 
P
i ci > pk.budget

crs ←

{0, 1}n

(pk, {(mi , σi , ci )}) ← A(crs)



 ≤ ε(n)

It is easy to see that by modifying Ver to additionally check whether pk.budget = c, we immediately get one-shot signatures.

3.4.1 From One-Shot Signatures to Budget Signatures
We get budget signatures from one-shot signatures by applying a variant of the Merkle signature
scheme Mer89 . Our public key will be the pair (pk, β) where pk is an one-shot signature public key
and β is the initial budget. To sign a message m with a signature of cost c, we first pick two pairs
(pkc , sk c ) ← Gen(crs) and (pkβ−c , sk β−c ) ← Gen(crs) and we generate a signature σ =
Sign(sk , (pkc , c, pkβ−c , β − c)). This signature indicates that c budget has been given to pkc and
the rest to pkβ−c . We then derive σ = Sign(sk c , m) and we return (pkc , pkβ−c , σ) as the signature of
m. To verify the signature, we also need to verify that the budgets of the two keys sum to β.
The secret key data structure.

The secret key sk is a binary tree T whose nodes N contain

3 attributes:
• N.pk: the public key of the node,
• N.β: the budget of the node,
• N.sk or N.σ: a quantum secret key or a signature. A node is always initiated with a quantum
secret key of a one-shot signature. When the secret key is used to sign a message, the key is
replaced by the signature. A node that has not used its secret key yet is “on”, whereas a node
that has used its key and already has a signature is “off”.
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The tree maintains the following invariances. Let Ni be a non-leaf node. Then,
• Ni is off and Ni .σ is the signature of the tuple (Ni0 .pk, Ni0 .β, Ni1 .pk, Ni1 .β), where Ni0 , Ni1
are its two children.
• Ni .β = Ni0 .β + Ni1 .β.
Intuitively, the node Ni that is on can delegate its budget Ni .β to its two children and turn off.
Therefore, if a node is on, then it necessarily is a leaf. However, there may exist leaves that are off.
The budget of the secret key, sk .budget is defined to be the sum of the budgets of its on nodes.
An on node Ni can be modified in two ways: either by signing a message m or by generating two
new leaves underneath it.
Let (Gen ′ , Sign ′ , Ver′ ) be an one-shot signature scheme. Our budget signature (Gen, Sign, Ver)
is defined as follows:
• Gen(crs, β) : Generate (pk′ , sk ′ ) ← Gen ′ (crs). Create a tree sk whose root node is N such
that N.pk = pk′ , N.β = β, N.sk = sk ′ . Create pk = (pk′ , β) and return (pk, sk ). The
budget of pk is defined as pk.budget = β.
• Sign(sk , m, c) first identifies a set S of leaves in sk whose budgets sum to c. In this process
a leaf Ni may have to be extended by adding two children underneath it, maintaining the
invariance. There can be different ways to implement this extension, but we leave this as part
of the implementation.
Then for each leaf N ∈ S, generate σ′ = Sign ′ (N.sk , m) and set N.σ = σ. The signature σ
of m is the subtree obtained from sk by traversing the paths from the root to the leaves in S
and as well as the public keys and the budgets of their siblings. The new secret key sk ′ is the
modified tree.
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• Ver(crs, (pk′ , β), m, σ, c) : Parse σ as a tree with root R and verify that R.pk = pk′ and
R.β = β. Then for every non-leaf Ni ∈ σ:
1. Verify that Ver′ (crs, Ni .pk, (Ni0 .pk, Ni0 .β, Ni1 .pk, Ni1 .β), Ni .σ) = 1.
2. Verify that Ni .β = Ni0 .β + Ni1 .β.
Moreover, initialize s = 0 and for every leaf Ni ∈ σ:
1. Verify that Ver′ (crs, Ni .pk, m, Ni .σ) = 1.
2. s = s + Ni .β.
Last, verify that s ≥ c.
Theorem 12. Suppose that (Gen ′ , Sign ′ , Ver′ ) is a correct and secure one-shot signature scheme. Then
(Gen, Sign, Ver) is a correct and secure budget signature scheme.
Proof. For correctness, since the initial sk is a tree with just the root, we have that pk.budget =
sk .budget = β. Moreover, extending a node with two children does not modify the total budget;
the budget is distributed between its children. Last, the leaves that were on and signed the message
and whose total budget was c now turned off and thus we get that sk ′ .budget = sk .budget − c.
For security, suppose that an adversary is able to come up with a public key pk as well as a set
{(mi , σi , ci )}, such that the total cost exceeds pk.budget and all signatures are accepted. Moreover,
since (Gen ′ , Sign ′ , Ver′ ) is a one-shot signature, it follows that all signatures σi are subtrees of a single tree T and that the sum of the budgets of its leaves exceeds pk.budget. Therefore, it follows that
there exist siblings Ni0 , Ni1 such that Ni .β < Ni0 .β + Ni1 .β, reaching a contradiction.
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3.5

Quantum Lightning and Quantum Money

Definition 13 (Quantum Money with Classical Communication). A quantum money scheme with
classical communication is a pair of interactive quantum algorithms (S, R ) as well as a generation
algorithm Gen with the following syntax:
• Gen(crs) : (pk, coin) takes as input a common string crs and outputs a quantum coin coin
and a public key pk.
• ⟨S(coin), R (crs, pk)⟩R : (coin ′ , b) is a classical protocol between S and R where at the end R
outputs a quantum coin coin ′ and a bit b.
• To simplify notation we deﬁne two functions Coin, Ver such that: Coin(crs, pk, coin) = coin ′
and Ver (crs, pk, coin) = b if and only if ⟨S(coin), R (crs, pk)⟩R = (coin ′ , b).
Correctness.

If (coin, pk) ← Gen(crs) then Ver (crs, pk, coin) = 1 with overwhelming prob-

ability. Moreover, if Ver (crs, pk, coin) = 1 then Ver (crs, pk, Coin(crs, pk, coin)) = 1 with overwhelming probability.
Security.

For an adversary B with input state s interacting with two honest receivers in an arbi-

trary way, let B(s), R 2 (crs, pk)

R2

be the two outputs bits of the two receivers. For any polynomial

time quantum adversaries A, B, there is a negligible function ε such that


Pr  B(s), R 2 (crs, pk)

R2

= (1, 1)

crs ←

{0, 1}n

(pk, s) ← A(crs)



 ≤ ε(n)

Notice that the above definition generalizes the notion of quantum money. Indeed, if we allow
quantum communication in the above protocol, then we can essentially get a single message protocol where the sender sends the coin to the receiver. Moreover, notice that interaction is necessary for
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sending a coin through a classical channel. Otherwise, one could simply copy the classical information and send it to multiple recipients.

3.5.1 Construction
We use our signature delegation mechanism to build our quantum money scheme. Intuitively, our
coin will consist of a list of pairs (pk1 , σ1 ), . . . , (pkn−1 , σn−1 ) together with the pair (pkn , sk n ).
To send our coin to someone, we first receive from them a new public key pkn+1 . We then use
our quantum secret key to generate a signature σn+1 ← Sign(sk n+1 , pkn+1 ) and we send the list
(pk1 , σ1 ), . . . , (pkn , σn ). To verify, the receiver checks that pk1 = pk and that all signatures in the
list are valid.
Let (Gen, Sign, Ver) be a one-shot signature. Our quantum money scheme (Gen ′ , S, R ) is defined as follows.
• Gen ′ (crs): run (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs). Set coin = (pk, sk ) and return (pk, coin).
• S(coin): Parse coin = [(pki , σi )]i∈[k−1] , (pkk , sk k ). Receive pk from R . Generate σk ←
Sign(sk k , pk) and send [(pki , σi )]i∈[k] to R .
• R (crs, pk′ ): Generate (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs) and send pk to S. Receive [(pki , σi )]i∈[k] from
S. If pk1 = pk′ and Ver(crs, pki , pki+1 , σi ) = 1 for all i ∈ [k − 1], where pkk = pk, then set
b = 1. Else b = 0. Set coin = [(pki , σi )]i∈[k] , (pk, sk ). Return (coin, b).
Clearly the above scheme is correct. For security, suppose there is an adversary that can interact with two honest receivers and can convince them with respect to the same public key pk. This
implies that the receivers sent pkk+1 , pk′k+1 such that pkk+1 ̸= pk′k+1 with overwhelming probability and the adversary replied with classical messages [(pki , σi )]i∈[k] , [(pk′i , σ′i )]i∈[k′ ] , such that
pk1 = pk′1 = pk and all signatures are valid. Therefore, there exists an i ∈ [k − 1] such that
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pki = pk′i but pki+1 ̸= pk′i+1 . Thus, the adversary has been able to create two signatures for the
same public key, breaking the security of one-shot signatures. In the blockchain terminology, the
adversary has been able to come up with a fork in the chain of signatures.
Full scheme and value of a coin.

The above definition and construction are a “mini-

scheme” version of a quantum money scheme, and the most essential tool in building quantum
money. As shown in AC12 , a trusted mint can then use a classical post-quantum signature scheme to
sign the public key of the coin. Using our budget signatures we can get additional flexibility from
our quantum money scheme. Now the mint instead of signing pk, it can sign the pair (pk, V) to
mint a coin of value V. We can then view such a coin as a budget signature with total budget V. One
can spend any fraction of V by simply signing the receivers’ public keys with different costs.

3.5.2 Primitive Smart Contracts
Our quantum money scheme gives us some flexibility in building smart contracts.
Threshold coins.

Imagine a scenario where a party owns a very valuable coin and is worried

that the secret key of this coin may leak. A way to protect against such a vulnerability is to create a
multi-signature smart contract consisting of n public keys as well as a threshold k ≤ n and signing
this contract using the secret key of the coin. Then for this coin to be spent, k signatures have to
be presented all of which signing the recipient’s new public key. By requiring k > n/2 we can
guarantee that this coin cannot be sent to two different recipients.
Coin Flipping.

Consider a simple coin flipping protocol between Alice and Bob, where the

winner gets the other party’s coin. To do that, Alice first picks a random bit bA and commits to it
using a hash function H and randomness rA . She retrieves a commitment cA . She then creates a new
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key pair using the one-shot signature (pkA , sk A ) ← Gen(crs). Bob does the same thing creating
a pair (pkB , sk B ) ← Gen(crs) as well as a commitment cB for a random bit bB and he sends pkB
and cB to Alice. Alice then uses her coin to sign the contract (pkA , pkB , cA , cB ) retrieving a signature
σ which she sends to Bob. Intuitively, this contract claims that if bA ⊕ bB = 0 then pkA is the
valid owner of the coin and if bA ⊕ bB = 1 the pkB is the valid owner of the coin. Subsequently,
both parties decommit their bits and the winner now possesses the secret key that can spend the
coin. Importantly, the hash function H used for commitment should be unequivocal. Of course,
the above contract does not guarantee fairness since Bob may decide to not reveal after seeing Alice’s
bit. Nonetheless, there is no direct incentive for Bob to not reveal if he knows upfront that he did
not win. Compare this with an equivalent smart contract on the blockchain where the revealing
message also requires a small transaction fee in order to be included in the blockchain that Bob may
be unwilling to pay.
More generally, quantum money with classical communication give rise to smart contracts where
one can efficiently verify that it is computationally infeasible to make the contract send more money
than what it was initiated with. This is easily enforced in a blockchain based smart contract since
one can easily check the balance of a contract at any given time. In our case, since all computations
are local, this property should be efficiently verified by the code of the contract. Crucially, a contract
that manages to trick such a verification procedure could completely devastate the quantum money
scheme.

3.5.3 Improvements
Succinctness.

In our construction, the size of the coin, the communication complexity as well

as the complexity of its verification increases linearly with the number of times it is transferred. This
is an undesirable property that we do not see in a scheme with quantum communication. By using
succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) we can keep these quantities non-
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increasing. The idea is to compress a list of length 2 of the form (pk1 , σ1 ), (pk2 , σ2 ) into a proof π
that proves that we know such a list that starts with pk1 and ends with a signature on a public key
pk3 . Moreover, we would like to be able to compose such proofs; given a proof πn that there is a list
that starts with pk1 and ends with a signature on our public key pkn and given a signature σn such
that Ver(crs, pkn , pkn+1 , σn ) = 1, we can generate a proof πn+1 that we know a key pkn as well as
proof πn and signature σn with the above properties.
Anonymity.

SNARKs alone do not necessarily hide the elements in the chain, thus potentially

leaking information regarding the keys that used to own the coin. In an ideal scenario, we would
like all banknotes to behave like actual coins that are indistinguishable from each other. For such
a notion to make sense we should turn to a full blown scheme instead of a mini-scheme. Here we
have several banknotes that are all signed by the mint. The requirement is that no adversary who
sends to an honest receiver two valid coins and gets back at random one of the two, should be able to
distinguish which of the two coins he received. By additionally requiring zero-knowledge from our
SNARKs we can achieve such a notion.

3.5.4 Decentralized Cryptocurrency
As already argued by Zhandry Zha19 , there is a way of getting decentralized blockchain-less cryptocurrencies by combining quantum lightning with proofs of work.
Definition 14 (Quantum Lightning Zha19 ). A quantum lightning is a pair of algorithms (Gen, Ver )
such that
• Gen(crs) : (pk, bolt ) takes as input a crs and outputs a public key pk and a quantum state
bolt .
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• Ver (crs, (pk, bolt )) : b takes as inputs a crs, a public key pk and a quantum state bolt and
outputs a bit b.
Correctness.

Ver (crs, Gen(crs)) = 1 with overwhelming probability over crs and the random-

ness of Gen, Ver .
Security.

For any polynomial quantum adversary A, there is a negligible function ε such that

 Ver (crs, (pk, bolt 0 )) = 1
Pr 
Ver (crs, (pk, bolt 1 )) = 1

crs ←

{0, 1}n

(pk, bolt 0 , bolt 1 ) ← A(crs)



 ≤ ε(n),

where bolt 0 , bolt 1 can potentially be entangled.
It is easy to see that one-shot signatures are a generalization of quantum lightning. Indeed, the secret key sk of a one-shot signature can be used as a bolt. To verify the bolt, we just need to pick two
messages m0 ̸= m1 and then sign the first but without measuring in the end. Then run the verification algorithm to verify that the signature is valid. If this is the case, measuring the output bit will
not disturb the state and thus we can rewind, sign the second message, again without measuring and
subsequently, verify the signature. Finally, we rewind again to retrieve the initial sk . Schematically,
the quantum circuit of the verification appears in figure 3.1. In the figure, UA corresponds to the
unitary operator implementing the algorithm A without any final measurement. Sign b corresponds
to signing the bit b and Verb corresponds to verifying the signature of the bit b, respectively.
The idea behind building a decentralized cryptocurrency out of quantum lightning is to consider
a bolt (pk, bolt ) valid only if H(pk) (or just pk) is small; e.g. starting with at least k zeros. Thus, a
user will have to spend a considerable amount of computational power in order to come up with
such a bolt. However, using quantum lightning we can only transfer a coin quantumly. By replacing quantum lightning with one-shot signatures we can achieve a cryptocurrency that can also be
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Figure 3.1: Quantum lightning from one-shot signatures. The veriﬁca on algorithm.

transferred classically. Indeed, the only difference between a full blown quantum money scheme
from a decentralized cryptocurrency scheme is the way we verify the first public key pk1 in the list
of public-key, signature pairs: in a quantum money scheme we want a signature of pk1 under the
mint’s public key, whereas in a decentralized cryptocurrency we want that pk1 is considerably small.
Arguably, as explained by Zhandry Zha19 , such a decentralized cryptocurrency would suffer from
huge inflation as technology improves.

3.6

Ordered Signatures and Applications

In an ordered signature scheme, every message is signed with respect to a tag t. Unlikely one-shot
signatures, we will allow the signer to sign any number of messages with associated tags. However,
security sill insist that the tags signed must be in increasing order. That is, once the signer signs a
message relative to tag t, it will become impossible to sign a message relative to a tag t′ < t.
We will model security as follows. Consider a signing adversary S and a receiver adversary R .
Here, S will send valid message/tag/signature (m, t, σ) triples to R . At the end of the interaction, R
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outputs a bit b.
We will consider a special class of adversaries, called ordered signers, which only outputs signed
messages where the tags are in increasing order. To formalize the fact that an adversary can sign a
message and keep it for later, we have S additionally interacts with a database D, where:
• D stores triples (m, t, σ). D is initially empty.
• S has arbitrary read access to D.
• S can write a triple to D only if (1) the signature is valid, and (2) the tag t is larger than any
tag already present in D.
• S can only send messages to R if they are in D.
Definition 15 (Ordered Signatures). An ordered signature is a tuple of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver)
with the following syntax:
• Gen(crs) : (pk, sk ) takes a common reference string crs and outputs a classical public key pk
and a quantum secret key sk .
• Sign(sk , m, t) : (sk ′ , σ) takes a secret key sk , a message m, and tag t, and outputs an updated
secret key sk ′ and a signature σ.
• Ver(crs, pk, m, t, σ) : b takes a common reference string crs, a public key pk, a message m, a
tag t, and a signature σ and outputs a bit b.
Correctness.

For any sequence of message/tag pairs (m1 , t1 ), . . . , (mn , tn ) such that t1 < · · · <

tn , the following hold with overwhelming probability. Let (pk, sk 0 ) ← Gen(crs). Then for i =
1, . . . , n, let (sk i , σi ) ← Sign(sk i−1 , mi , ti ). Then we have that Ver(crs, pk, mi , ti , σ) = 1 for all i.
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Security.

For any quantum polynomial time signing adversary S and any quantum polynomial

time receiver adversary R , there is an ordered signing adversary S ′ such that R has negligible advantage in distinguishing S from S ′ .

3.6.1 Construction
We construct our ordered signatures using a chain of keys and signatures, similar to signature delegation. A signature includes the entire chain, and we leave open the problem of creating more succinct
signatures, for example using composable SNARKs.
Let ⊥ be a special message to denote no message was used. Let (Gen ′ , Sign ′ , Ver′ ) be a one-shot
signature.
• Gen(crs) : Let (pk, sk ) ← Gen ′ (crs). Then let C = ⟨(pk, −∞, ⊥, ⊥)⟩ be an list of length
1. Then output (pk, (C, sk )).
• Sign((C, sk ), m, t) : Generate (pk′ , sk ′ ) ← Gen ′ (crs). Then let σ ← Sign ′ (sk , (pk′ , m, t)).
Let C = C||(pk′ , t, m, σ). Then output ((C, sk ′ ), C).
• Ver(crs, pk, m, t, C) : Check that for all i ∈ [|C|], it holds that Ci−1 .t < Ci .t and that
Ver′ (crs, Ci−1 .pk, (Ci .pk, Ci .m, Ci .t), Ci .σ) = 1. Moreover, check that C0 .pk = pk and
C|C|−1 .t = t. If all checks pass, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Correctness is immediate from the correctness of one shot signatures.
To show security, consider any polynomial time signing adversary S. We create an ordered simulating adversary S ′ as follows. For any message m it receives from R , it forwards it to S. When S
returns a triple (m, t, C) which, by assumption passes the verification algorithm, S ′ acts as follows.
It parses C as a list of signatures, where every prefix C[1,k] is a signature of the message Ck+1 .m with
tag Ck+1 .t. It then stores in the database D all triples (Ck+1 .m, Ck+1 .t, C[1,k] ) that it is allowed to, in
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order of increasing tags. Of course, it may be the case that S ′ is not allowed to store some of these
triples because their tags are smaller than the largest tag in D. Finally, S ′ forwards (m, t, C) to R if it
appears in D.
Now, suppose that R can distinguish S from S ′ . This implies that at some round during the
interaction between S ′ and R the triple (m, t, C) could not be found in the database because the
database’s largest tag was already t′ > t. We claim that at this point there is a break in the one-shot
signature. Let (m′ , t′ , C′ ) be the triple with the largest tag t′ in D at that point and notice that C is
not a prefix of C′ since otherwise, it would appear in the database D. Therefore, since both C, C′
share the same public key as their first element, there must exist signatures σi , σ′i such that both of
them verify under the same public key pki−1 .

3.6.2 Provably Secret Signing Keys
In this section we aim to create a signature scheme where the signing key is provably unique; i.e.,
there is an efficient way to convince ourselves that our secret key has not leaked or, put differently,
as long as we can sign messages no one else can. Such a powerful primitive is clearly impossible classically since one can clone a classical state. One can view such a primitive as a much stronger version
of the no-cloning theorem. The no-cloning theorem by itself implies that one cannot clone an unknown state but nothing is stated about how useful such a state is. Moving to public-key quantum
money, the no-cloning is strengthened by claiming that one cannot clone a quantum state even if
there is an efficient way to verify this state. Here we take this idea one step further proving that one
cannot clone a quantum state even if it actually has some useful functionality; in particular, it is a
signing key.
In fact, here we are proving something even stronger; namely, that two isolated adversaries cannot
sign messages that verify with the same public key. This holds even if the adversaries come up with
“weird” states that do not correspond to valid signing keys and even if the adversaries manage to sign
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messages without using the official signing algorithm.
Informally, we require that no adversary can come up with a public key together with two states
such that both states can be used to sign “unpredictable” messages. Here, the notion of unpredictability requires special attention. For example, an adversary might have computed a signature
some time in the past and present it as a new one. We prevent such a scenario by introducing an adversarially chosen, yet high-entropy distribution on the messages. An adversary wins if they can sign
messages that we sample from this distribution. Formally, we have:
Definition 16 (Single Signer Security). A signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Ver) is single signer secure if
for any quantum polynomial time adversaries A, A0 , A1 , and for any eﬃciently sampleable distributions D0 , D1 with super-logarithmic min-entropy over the message space, there is a negligible function ε
such that








 Ver(crs, pk, m0 , σ0 ) = 1
Pr 

 Ver(crs, pk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1






crs ← {0, 1}n
(pk, sk 0 , sk 1 ) ← A(crs)
m 0 ← D0
m1 ← D1
σ0 ← A0 (sk 0 , m0 )
σ1 ← A1 (sk 1 , m1 )









 ≤ ε(n),








where sk 0 , sk 1 can potentially be entangled.
The above definition aims to capture a particular type of attacks that we call splitting attacks. In
such an attack, one may try to split a secret key into two secret keys that potentially sign different
sets of messages; for example sk 0 may sign messages that begin with 0 and sk 1 may sign messages
that begin with 1.
Theorem 13 (Ordered Signatures to Single Signers). Single signer signatures exist if ordered signatures exist.
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Proof. Let O = (Gen ′ , Sign ′ , Eval′ ) be an ordered signature scheme. Our single signer scheme
(Gen, Sign, Ver) is defined as follows:
• Gen(crs) : Run (pk, sk ′0 ) ← Gen ′ (crs). Set sk 0 = (sk ′0 , 0) and output (pk, sk 0 ).
• Sign(sk i , m) : Parse sk i = (sk ′i , t). Run (σ′ , sk ′i+1 ) ← Sign ′ (sk ′i , m, t). Set σ = (σ′ , t) and
sk i+1 = (sk ′i+1 , t + 1). Output (σ, sk i+1 ).
• Ver(crs, m, σ) : Parse σ = (σ′ , t) and output Ver′ (crs, pk, m, t, σ).
Now suppose that there are adversaries A, A0 , A1 and distributions D0 , D1 , such that the above
probability is non-negligible. A ′ (crs) first runs A(crs) retrieving a public key pk and quantum
states sk 0 , sk 1 . It then samples m0 ← D0 and retrieves σ0 ← A0 (sk 0 , m0 ). Subsequently, it samples m1 ← D1 and retrieves σ1 ← A1 (sk 1 , m1 ). Let t0 , t1 be the tags of σ0 , σ1 respectively. Since
D1 has high entropy and O is an ordered signature scheme, it follows that Pr[t1 ≤ t0 ] is negligible.
Moreover, since A0 and A1 are independent, A ′ could first run A1 and subsequently A0 in which case
A ′ breaks security of ordered signatures with non-negligible probability.

3.6.3 From Ordered Signatures to Delayed Signatures
Definition 17 (δ-Delay Signatures). A delay signature is a tuple of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver) with
the following syntax:
• Gen(crs) : (pk, sk ) takes a common reference string crs and outputs a classical public key pk
and a quantum secret key sk .
• Sign(sk , m, rd, fd) : (sk ′ , σ) takes a secret key sk , a message m, a reverse delay rd, and a
forward delay fd and outputs an updated secret key sk ′ and a signature σ.
• Ver(crs, pk, m, rd, fd, σ) : b takes a common reference string crs, a public key pk, a message
m, a reverse delay rd, and a forward delay fd and a signature σ and outputs a bit b.
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Correctness.

For any sequence of messages (m1 , rd1 , fd1 ), . . . , (mn , rdn , fdn ), the following holds

with overwhelming probability. Let (pk, sk 0 ) ← Gen(crs). Then for i ∈ [n], let (sk i , σi ) ←
Sign(sk i−1 , mi , rdi , fdi ). Then we have that Ver(crs, pk, mi , rdi , fdi , σ) = 1 for all i.
δ-Delay.

For any wall-clock time delta T, any pair of delays (rd1 , fd1 ), (rd2 , fd2 ), any eﬃciently

sampleable distributions D0 , D1 with super-logarithmic min-entropy over the message space, and any
quantum polynomial time adversaries A = (A1 , A2 , A3 ), there is a negligible function ε such that
when the wall-clock time delta between the start of A2 and the completion of A3 is at most (1 − δ)T,


crs ← {0, 1}n







 Ver(crs, pk, m0 , rd0 , fd0 , σ0 ) = 1
Pr 

 Ver(crs, pk, m1 , rd1 , fd1 , σ1 ) = 1






(pk, sk 0 ) ← A1 (crs)
m 0 ← D0
m1 ← D1
σ0 ← A2 (sk 0 , m0 , rd0 , fd0 )
σ1 ← A3 (sk 1 , m1 , rd1 , fd1 )









 ≤ ε(n),








We build our delay signatures on ordered signatures and the incremental proof of sequential
work of Dottling et al. DLM19 . Dottling et al.’s work is not proven secure against a quantum adversary, we conjecture that a classical incremental proof of sequential work satisfying their definition
could exist against quantum adversaries. We denote the ordered signature algorithms as prefixed
with Ord. We denote the incremental proof of sequential work algorithms as prefixed with Ipsw.
We additionally need for our construction a subroutine StartSeqWork, which takes a message
and starts sequential work in the background; a subroutine SeqWork, which takes a message, proof,
and accumulated time and performs sequential work; and a minimum delay quanta Δ. We construct the algorithms as follows:
• Gen(crs) : Let (pk1 , sk 1 ) ← Ord.Gen(crs). Output (pk1 , (sk 1 , 1)) and finally start
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StartSeqWork(pk1 ) in the background.
• Sign(sk , m, rd, fd) : Let (sk , c) ← sk . Let fd′ be the fd parameter from the previous call
to Sign, or 0 if c = 1. If a call has not been made to SeqWork with T ≥ max(rd, fd′ ), wait
until such a call has been made. Halt SeqWork, and let χ, T, π be the parameters for the first
call such that T ≥ max(rd, fd′ ). Let (sk ′ , σc ) ← Ord.Sign(sk , (m, rd, fd, χ, T, π), c).
Let σ be the list of c tuples. Each tuple i contains the σi value from the corresponding prior
execution of Sign, and contains the respective (mi , rdi , fdi , χi , Ti , πi ) values corresponding
to that execution’s input to Sign. Output ((sk ′ , c + 1), σ). Start StartSeqWork((m, π)) in
the background.
• Ver(crs, pk, m, rd, fd, σ) : Let c = |σ|. Verify Ord.Ver(pk, m, c, σc ) = 1. Verify that for
each i ∈ [1 . . . c], Ipsw.Ver(χi , Ti , πi ) = 1. Verify that χ1 = pk and T1 ≥ rd1 . Verify that
χi = (mi−1 , πi−1 ) and Ti ≥ max(rdi , fdi−1 ) for i ∈ [2 . . . c]. If all checks verify to true
output 1, otherwise output 0.
• StartSeqWork(χ) : Let π ← Ipsw.Prove(χ, Δ). Run SeqWork(m, Δ, π).
• SeqWork(χ, T, π) : Record the parameters in a way accessible to Sign. Moreover, let π′ ←
Ipsw.Inc(χ, T, Δ, π) and run SeqWork(χ, T + Δ, π′ )
Correctness is immediate from the correctness of that ordered signature definition. Note that if
 
T = max(rdi , fdi−1 ), an honest prover will require ΔT Δ time to complete signature i.
To show the δ-Delay property, consider an adversary who is able to produce two signatures
within wall-clock time T < (1 − δ) max(rd1 , fd0 ). Because the proof of sequential work in σ1
relies on the message m0 , the proof could not have been started before A1 learned of m0 . Because A1
outputs a signature m0 before A2 is given m1 , and because the list of signatures is append-only and
unique by the security of ordered signatures, the list of signatures output by A2 must contain the
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signature on m0 . Because proofs of sequential work are verified, by the soundness property of incremental proofs of sequential work, the signature immediately following the signature on m0 must
have included a proof of sequential work taking at least fd0 time, and the signature of m1 must have
included a proof of sequential work taking at least rd1 time. These signatures need not be distinct. If
the α parameter from the incremental proof of sequential work is defined appropriately relative to δ,
then the probability the adversary succeeded on both checks is negligible.

3.7

Proofs of Quantumness and Min-Entropy

In this section we show that one-shot signatures can be used to create public-coin interactive proofs
of quantumness as well as publicly verifiable proofs of quantumness and min-entropy. Although
the constructions are fairly simple, we include them here together with their definitions for completeness.

3.7.1 Proofs of Quantumness
For interactive (possibly quantum) algorithms P, V, let ⟨P, V⟩ be the output of V after interacting
with P.
Definition 18. A public-coin interactive proof of quantumness is a pair of interactive algorithms
(P , V), where P is quantum and V is classical. P and V run a classical multi-round protocol in which,
at each round, Ver picks a random message m ← {0, 1}n and sends it to P .
Correctness.

⟨P (crs), V(crs)⟩ = 1 with overwhelming probability over crs and the randomness

of P .
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Security.

For any classical polynomial time adversary P∗ , there is a negligible function ε such that
Pr [⟨P∗ (crs), V(crs)⟩ = 1|crs ← {0, 1}n ] ≤ ε(n)

Theorem 14. A 3-message public-coin interactive proof of quantumness exists if one-shot signatures
exist.
Proof. P (crs) runs (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs) and sends pk to V. V(crs) picks a random message m ←
{0, 1}n and sends it to P . Subsequently, P generates σ ← Sign(sk , m) and sends it to V. Finally, V
runs b ← Ver(crs, m, σ) and accepts if b = 1. Correctness is straightforward from the correctness
of the one-shot signature scheme. For security, assume that there exists a classical prover P∗ that
can convince V with non-negligible probability. We will create an adversary A against the one-shot
signature. A(crs) first runs P∗ (crs) and gets a public key pk. It then picks at random a message m0
and asks from P∗ to sign it retrieving a signature σ0 . Since the adversary is classical, A can rewind
P∗ and ask from P∗ to sign a second random message m1 with respect to pk, retrieving a signature
σ1 . By a standard forking lemma, it follows that both signatures will be valid with non-negligible
probability.
Combining theorem 14 with the following lemma proved by Liu and Zhandry LZ19 and by Don
et al. DFMS19 independently, we immediately get a non-interactive proof of quantumness in the
quantum random oracle model.
Lemma 4 ( LZ19,DFMS19 ). Any public-coin interactive proof can be turned into non-interactive in the
random oracle model.
Theorem 15. A publicly veriﬁable non-interactive proof of quantumness exists in the random oracle
model if one-shot signatures exist.
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3.7.2 Certifiable Min-Entropy
Similarly to a proof of quantumness, a proof of min-entropy is a protocol between a prover and a
verifier at the end of which, the verifier outputs a string r of n bits together with a bit b. Correctness
requires that at the end of the protocol the entropy of r is n. Security states that if the verifier accepts
(b = 1) then r has to have super-logarithmic min-entropy. For a random variable r of n bits, the
min-entropy of r is defined as Hmin (r) = − log maxx∈{0,1}n Pr[x = r].
Definition 19. A public-coin interactive proof of min-entropy is a pair of interactive algorithms
(P , V), where P is quantum and V is classical. P and V run a classical multi-round protocol in which,
at each round, Ver picks a random message m ← {0, 1}n and sends it to P .
Correctness.

⟨P (crs), V(crs)⟩ = (1, r) and Hmin (r) = n with overwhelming probability over

crs and the randomness of P .
Security.

For any quantum polynomial time adversary P ∗ and for any polynomial p, there is a

negligible function ε such that


Pr 


⟨P ∗ (crs), V(crs)⟩

= (1, r)

Hmin (r) ≤ log p(n)


crs ← {0, 1}n  ≤ ε(n)

Theorem 16. A 3-message public-coin interactive proof of min-entropy exists if one-shot signatures
exist.
Proof. The protocol is identical to the protocol above with the only difference being that the verifier
V together with the bit b, also outputs the public key pk as the randomness r. If a malicious prover
could convince V of an r with logarithmic entropy, then by running this adversary polynomially
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many times with independently random challenge messages every time, then we would be be able to
sign two messages with respect to the same public key, hence breaking the one-shot signature.
Again, by invoking lemma 4, we can turn the protocol into non-interactive in the random oracle
model.

75

Αν σηκώσεις το χέρι να χτυπήσεις, τότε χτύπα.
Ελένη Παρτσάλη, η δασκάλα μου στο πιάνο

4

Stateful Oracle to Stateless Oracle

Transformation

4.1

Overview

A predecessor of one-shot signatures is quantum tokens for digital signatures. These are quantum
states that can be used to sign a single message. Their main difference is that they have to be cre-

76

ated honestly and then handed to the adversary. Here, we show that quantum tokens for digital
signatures – and, in fact, their secret key version where the adversary only has access to a verification oracle – can turn any stateful oracle A with a classical interface into a stateless one B. We do
this by modeling A as a stateless oracle with a stateful database that stores the queries. Then, we independently create q tokens where q is an upper bound of the number of queries, and store their
verification keys inside B. For every new query, B has to take as input all previous queries. This way,
we guarantee that B is stateless. Moreover, to guarantee that B cannot be rewound, B also expects a
signature for each of these queries.

4.2

Definitions

In this section we aim to give a generic transformation that turns any classically queried stateful
oracle into a stateless one. Below we describe the notion of quantum tokens for digital signatures
which is the necessary tool in our construction. We then give a formal definition of what such a
transformation has to satisfy and then we give the construction and the security analysis.
For our generic transformation of stateful to stateless oracles, it is sufficient to use a secret key
version of tokens for digital signatures, where there is no public key but only a verification oracle
that hides a secret verification key. We will call this primitive a disposable message authentication
code.
Definition 20 (Disposable Message Authentication Codes (MACs)). The syntax and the correctness
are identical to those of tokens for signatures. Security is modiﬁed as follows:
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Security.

For any quantum polynomial time algorithm A, there is a negligible function ε such

that

 Ver(vk, m0 , σ0 ) = 1
Pr 
Ver(vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

(vk, sk ) ←
({(m0 , σ0 ), (m1 , σ1 )}) ←

Gen(1n )

A Ver(vk,·,·) (sk )



 ≤ ε(n),

where the oracle Ver(vk, ·, ·) can be queried in superposition.
Notice in the above definition that vk is never given to the adversary, in fact it is a secret verification key that is hidden inside the verification oracle. Such a key can potentially be strong enough to
generate several valid quantum secret keys. One way to achieve tokens from disposable MACs is to
obfuscate the class Ver(vk, ·, ·) in an virtual black box way.
Theorem 17 ( BS17 ). Disposable message authentication codes exist unconditionally.
The notion of quantum disposable message authentication codes is powerful enough to turn
any stateful and classically-queried classical oracle into a stateless one. Our technique follows the
approach of Döttling et al. DKMQN15 . We model a stateful oracle as a stateless oracle together with
a stateful database that stores the queries. Then every time the oracle is queried, it is reset and then
runs all the previous queries, followed by the last one.
Using this formalization the transformation of a stateful algorithm A into a stateless B works as
follows. As a first step assume some polynomial number q of queries are allowed. We create q singlebit disposable MAC key-pairs (ski , ρi ). Then the algorithm B has the following structure. At the
first time it is called, it is queried with x1 together with a signature σ1 on x1 with respect to the key
sk1 . If the signature is valid, then the algorithm runs as a subroutine A with input x1 and returns A’s
output. For the next query x2 , the calling algorithm should provide both (x1 , σ1 ) and (x2 , σ2 ), where
σ2 is a signature of x2 with respect to sk2 . Now B will first run A on the first input and then run A
on the second input and return this result.
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Stateful oracle.

A stateful oracle can be thought of as a sequence of stateless oracles {Ci },

where each of them after execution outputs a state that is fed as input to the next oracle together
with a query. Equivalently, a stateful oracle could keep a list of all the previous queries and reexecute the whole computation from the beginning for each new query.
Definition 21 (Stateful algorithm). A stateful oracle A with respect to a family of stateless oracles
{Ci }i∈Z works as follows:
Code for A :
S ← []
loop: On query x
Append x on S and parse S as (x1 , . . . , xτ )
state ← ⊥
for i ∈ [τ] do
(y, state) ← Ci (xi , state)
return y

Stateful to stateless transformation.

A stateful to stateless oracle transformation is

an algorithm that takes as input the description of a stateful oracle and returns the description of a
stateless oracle together with a quantum state. We require the correctness that any algorithm with
oracle access to the stateful algorithm can be simulated by another algorithm with oracle access to
the stateless one. We also require the security that an algorithm with access to the stateless oracle
does not have extra power over one that has access to the stateful one.
Definition 22 (Stateful to Stateless Transformation). Let A be a family of stateful oracles {Ai }i∈Z .
Gen is a stateful to stateless oracle transformation with respect to A if there is a family B = {Bj }j∈Z of
stateless oracles such that:
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Gen(1n , i) → (sk , j) is an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter n as well as an
index i that corresponds to the stateful oracle Ai and returns a quantum state sk together with
an index j that corresponds to the stateless oracle Bj .
Correctness.

For any (polynomial time) algorithm C , there exists a (respectively polynomial

time) simulator S such that for any i ∈ Z, C Ai ≡ S Bj (sk ), where (j, sk ) ← Gen(1n , i).
Security.

For any (polynomial time) quantum algorithm C with polynomially many queries,

there exists a (respectively polynomial time) time quantum simulator S with polynomially many
queries such that for any possibly auxiliary quantum state aux , which is a partial system that may
be entangled with a reference system R, say trR ag
ux = aux , and for any i ∈ Z,
C Bj ⊗ IR (1n , sk ⊗ ag
ux ) ∼s S Ai ⊗ IR (1n , ag
ux ),
where (j, sk ) ← Gen(1n , i).

4.3

The transformation

Here we formally present the construction that transforms any polynomial time stateful oracle into
a stateless one. Intuitively, the construction works as follows. Our new stateless oracle B has to take
as input all the previous queries. In this way, we guarantee that B does not need to keep a state. On
the other hand, we have to impose that B cannot be rewound, i.e., if the first query is x, then there is
no way we can start B from the beginning with a query x′ ̸= x. To achieve this, B is parameterized
by a list s1 , . . . , sq of secret keys for a disposable message authentication code, where q is the total
number of queries. For each query xj , the calling algorithm has to also provide a signature σj for xj
corresponding to the secret key sj . Before executing the query, B first verifies that the signatures for
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all the queries are valid. If this is the case, then it runs all the queries one by one and returns the final
outcome.
Let A = {Ai }i∈Z = {Ci,j }i,j∈Z be the class of all polynomial time oracles, where Ci,j are the
stateless oracles corresponding to Ai . Moreover, let (Gen, Sign, Ver) be a secure disposable message
authentication code. We define the class B = {B(s1 ,...,sq ,i) }s1 ,...,sq ,i as follows:
B(s1 ,...,sq ,i) ((x1 , σ1 ), . . . , (xτ , στ ))
if Ver(sj , xj , σj ) = 0 for some j ∈ [τ]
return “Invalid signature”
state ← ⊥
for j ∈ [τ] do
(y, state) ← Ci,j (x, state)
return y
Clearly, B is a class of stateless oracles. Now, the generation algorithm Gen ′ (1n , i) of our transformation first runs (sj , sk j ) ← Gen(1n ) for each j ∈ [q] and then returns ((s1 , . . . , sq , i), sk 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ sk q ).
To argue completeness, let C be any algorithm that has access to the stateful oracle A. We will
create a simulator S that takes as input the quantum state sk 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ sk q and has oracle access to
the stateless oracle B. S initializes the number of queries τ = 0 and the sequence of queries S to be
the empty sequence. Then it starts C and simulates C ’s oracle as follows:
Oracle(x)
τ←τ+1
σ ← Sign(ρτ , x)
Append (x, σ) on S and parse S as ((x1 , σ1 ), . . . , (xτ , στ ))
return B((x1 , σ1 ), . . . , (xτ , στ ))
Therefore, the completeness follows from that of the disposable message authentication codes.
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4.4

Security Analysis

To argue security, we create a simulator S that takes as input an auxiliary state aux and has oracle access to the algorithm A. S first creates q pairs of disposable MAC keys s1 , . . . , sq together with their
quantum states sk 1 , . . . , sk q . Then S starts C ⊗ IR with input sk 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ sk q ⊗ ag
ux , where
trR ag
ux = aux . Moreover, S simulates the oracle B as shown below. During the simulation, S initializes two empty lists Q, R whose size increases at the same time. Informally, Q will contain the
longest sequence of queries x1 , . . . , x|Q| that have a valid signature. R will contain the corresponding answers that the oracle A replies. We denote by Qi the i-th element of Q and similarly for A. S
simulates the following oracle to C :
Bsim ((x1 , σ1 ), . . . , (xτ , στ ))
if Ver(sj , xj , σj ) = 0 for some j ∈ [τ]
return “Invalid signature”
if (x1 , . . . , xτ ) is a prefix of Q
return Rτ (no need to query A)
if Q is not a prefix of (x1 , . . . , xτ )
return ⊥
l ← |Q| + 1
for i ∈ [l, τ] do
Qi ← xi (i.e. append xi to Q)
Ri ← A(xi ) (i.e. append the answer to R)
return Rτ
Note that if the execution reaches the line return ⊥, then the adversary will be able to sign two
messages using the same key.
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Let E be the event that the line return ⊥ is executed. Let q′ be the number of queries C makes to
its oracle B and let also {(x1j , σ1j ), . . . , (xτj j , στj j )}j∈[q′ ] be the queries. Equivalently, this event can
be defined as the event that C makes two queries with different messages in some position i and the
corresponding signatures are both valid:
E = {∃j, j′ ∈ [q′ ], i ∈ [q] : xij ̸= xij′ ∧ Ver(si , xij , σij ) = 1 ∧ Ver(si , xij′ , σij′ ) = 1}.
Then, our simulator works exactly as C except for the event E; i.e., for any output o, any n ∈ Z
and any auxiliary quantum state aux , it holds that
h
i


B
Pr C (s1 ,...,sq ,i) ⊗ IR (1n , sk 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ sk q ⊗ ag
ux ) = o − Pr S Ai ⊗ IR (1n , ag
ux ) = o ≤ Pr[E].
Now, suppose that there exists an adversary C , value n ∈ Z and quantum state aux such that
Pr[E] ≥ e(n) for some non-negligible function e. We use C to create an adversary C ′ against the
disposable MAC. C ′ takes as input a quantum state sk and has oracle access to the algorithm V(·, ·).
It starts by picking a random position i∗ ← [q]. In this position, C′ will plug in the quantum state
sk . For simplicity we rename sk as sk i∗ . Moreover, C′ creates q − 1 pairs (si , sk i ) ← Gen(1n ) for
i ∈ [q] − {i∗ }. Then C ′ ⊗ IR runs C ⊗ IR with input (sk 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ sk q ⊗ ag
ux ) and simulates
the oracle B as shown below. As before, C ′ has to keep two lists Q, R that are initialized to the empty
lists.
Informally, C ′ runs by simulating the stateless oracle and at the same time looking for a pair of
inputs that can break the challenge disposable MAC. For the queries that do not correspond to i∗ ,
C ′ can use its own secret key. For the ones that correspond to i∗ , the simulator uses its verification
oracle V. If the adversary ever submits two different sequences of queries such that they are not a
prefix of each other, then the simulation stops. With probability 1/q the sequences will differ on the
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i∗ -th position, in which case C ′ will be able to break its challenge.
Bsim ((x1 , σ1 ), . . . , (xτ , στ ))
if Ver(sj , xj , σj ) = 0 for some j ∈ [τ] − {i∗ }
return “Invalid signature”
if i∗ ≤ τ and V(xi∗ , σi∗ ) = 0
return “Invalid signature”
if (x1 , . . . , xτ ) is a prefix of Q
return Rτ (no need to query A)
if Q is not a prefix of (x1 , . . . , xτ ) and xi∗ ̸= Qi∗
Stop simulation and return (xi∗ , σi∗ , Qi∗ , σ∗ )
else
Abort
if i∗ ≤ τ
σ∗ ← σi∗ (remember the first signature)
l ← |Q| + 1
for i ∈ [l, τ] do
Qi ← xi (i.e. append xi to Q)
Ri ← A(xi ) (i.e. append the answer to R)
return Rτ
We can see that the advantage of C ′ is Pr[E]/q ≥ e(n)/q, which implies that C ′ breaks the disposable MAC game with non-negligible probability by using only polynomially many queries to the
verification oracle.
As a corollary, we get that one-time as well as many-time memories are possible relative to a classically queried oracle: the stateful oracle that runs the one time memory can be simply turned into a
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stateless one using our above transformation.
Theorem 18. One-time memories exist unconditionally relative to a classically queried oracle.
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Oh, it’s quite simple. If you are a friend,
you speak the password, and the doors will open.
Gandalf

5

Unclonable Decryption

5.1

Overview

We initiate the study of encryption where the encryption keys, the ciphertexts and the messages are
classical whereas the decryption key is quantum and unclonable; we call such an encryption a singledecryptor encryption.
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Definitions (Section 5.2).

We begin by introducing essential security definitions that capture

the notion of single decryptors. These definitions span in two main dimensions; secret-key versus
public-key and honestly versus dishonestly generated keys. We make comparisons between them
as well as between these and standard security such as indistinguishability under chosen message
attacks.
Secret-key encryption with honestly generated keys (Section 5.3).

We then move

on to constructions. We start with the simple scenario where there is a classical encryption key ek
and a corresponding quantum decryption key |dk⟩. We imagine the adversary is given |dk⟩, and tries
to use it to derive two states |dk0 ⟩, |dk1 ⟩ such that both states are capable of decrypting ciphertexts.
In the most basic setting, the adversary must clone the key without knowledge of ek and without
seeing any ciphertexts. Preserving the standard definition of semantic security, we require that no
adversary, given |dk⟩ can output two quantum states such that both of them can be used to distinguish the encryptions of two messages. We also allow the |dkb ⟩ to deviate from honest decryption
keys and instead take any form.
We observe that this definition resembles the definition of unclonable encryption, defined by
Broadbent and Lord BL19 . There, the setting is slightly different: the secret (encryption and decryption) key is classical, whereas the ciphertext is quantum. Security requires that an adversary, given
the quantum ciphertext (that encrypts mb for a random bit b) and no access to the secret key, cannot
output two ciphertexts such that, if later two isolated adversaries are given the corresponding ciphertext and the secret key, can both predict b. We show that selectively secure single decryptor encryption and unclonable encryption are roughly equivalent, by demonstrating how to swap the roles of
ciphertext and decryption key in the Broadbent-Lord protocol. Luckily, they prove that unclonable
encryption is attainable information theoretically by cleverly manipulating BB84 states BB20 . Since
our black box transformation does not make any computational assumptions, the resulting scheme
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is also secure unconditionally.
Moreover, we show that information-theoretic security is impossible in the setting where the
adversary is given arbitrarily many ciphertexts before performing the splitting attack, even if the
adversary is not given the encryption key. An essential tool is the gentle measurement lemma that
states that deterministic quantum computations can always be rewound.
Public-key construction (Section 5.4).

We continue with a public-key construction, and

also in the setting on dishonestly generated keys. This means that the adversarial decryptor generates his own (classical) encryption key ek, and he then tries to devise two arbitrary decryption keys
|dk1 ⟩, |dk2 ⟩ each capable of decrypting ciphertexts to ek. The challenging issue here is that the adversary is free to choose ek, |dk1 ⟩, |dk2 ⟩ all together by whatever means he chooses.
We prove that one-shot signatures AGKZ20 and extractable witness encryption with quantum
auxiliary information GGSW13,GKP

+ 13

suffice to build such a primitive. A one-shot signature is a sig-

nature scheme with a quantum signing key that allows for signing any single message. However,
signing two different messages with respect to the same verification key is computationally infeasible. Witness encryption allows for encrypting to NP statements, with the guarantee that (1) any
witness allows for decryption, and (2) the only way to decrypt is, intuitively, to have a witness.
The idea behind such a scheme is to first generate a public key-secret key pair of a one-shot signature. To encrypt a message, one first picks randomness r and witness encrypts m with respect to
the language {(r, σ)} where σ is a valid signature of r. Crucially, any adversary who is able to split
the decryption key, should also be able to generate two different signatures with respect to the same
public key, therefore violating security of one-shot signatures.
Curiously, whereas one-shot signatures are inherently a one-time object — security implies that
the secret key is destroyed after signing — we demonstrate how to implement the above idea so as to
preserve the decryption key for future ciphertexts. In particular, the quantum decryption key in our
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scheme can be re-used arbitrarily many times.
Broadcast encryption with unclonable decryption keys (Section 5.5).

Motivated

by the goal of traitor tracing, we consider a variant of broadcast encryption with unclonable decryption keys. Such a scheme would be useful for digital rights management, as it would prevent a user
from publishing their secret key, allowing for the decryption of all broadcasts. Classically, it is impossible to prevent such behavior, and instead a tracing procedure must be performed to identify
the user and take remedial action.
We develop a scheme where the encryptor can specify an arbitrary set S of recipients. The attacker, who controls some subset T of users, can obviously create m := |S ∩ T| decryption keys, one
for each user in S that they control. We require that the adversary cannot split his keys into m + 1
decryption keys that can decrypt ciphertexts to S. In our scheme, the sizes of public keys, secret keys,
and ciphertexts are all independent of the number of users.
Splittable attribute-based encryption (Section 5.6).

We define a version of attribute-

based public-key encryption with dishonestly generated keys, where the owner of the secret key is
able to split the key into two different keys, each decrypting a disjoint set of ciphertexts. In more
detail, we imagine that each decryption key has an underlying predicate p, initially mapping all attributes to 1, and each message can be encrypted with respect to an attribute x. Given any such decryption key and a predicate q, one can split the key into two keys: one that decrypts ciphertexts
with attribute x such that p(x) ∧ q(x) = 1 and one that decrypts ciphertexts with attribute x such
that p(x) ∧ ¬q(x) = 1. Security is defined very naturally; there is no way for two isolated adversaries
to decrypt an encryption that is done with respect to the same attribute. The construction in this
setting can be thought of in a modular sense. First, we can build a form of “splittable attribute-based
signatures” where one can only sign messages as long as they satisfy a predicate. Using the delega-
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tion mechanism of AGKZ20 we can then split the key into two keys signing messages belonging to two
disjoint sets. Then, using witness encryption we can transform signatures into encryption.
Classically revocable time-released encryption (Section 5.7).

We then introduce the

concept of delay decryption where the decryption key not only is unclonable but it is also “slow”, in
the sense that its holder is forced to wait a specific time before they can decrypt again. By being unclonable, this also implies a bound on the rate at which ciphertexts can be decrypted (as in, number
of ciphertexts per period of time). We note that classically, using parallelism it is always possible to
amplify the rate of decryption arbitrarily.
Moreover, we go one step further and allow a revocation mechanism: if the decryptor has not
had enough time to decrypt, they can generate a classical proof that they revoke a specific ciphertext.
As long as this proof is generated early enough, we are sure that the decryptor will never be able
to decrypt this ciphertext. Toward this, we first make use of delay signatures as defined by Amos
et al. AGKZ20 in order to create a notion of revocable delayed signatures 5.7.1. These are essentially
proofs of sequential work MMV13,DLM19 , where one can only generate proofs of work sequentially
even if they have a polynomial number of parallel processors. In other words, one cannot work on
two different challenges in parallel, as with regular proofs of work. Moreover, revocation guarantees
that we can either provide a proof of work (which is essentially a signature) for a challenge r or a
proof of revocation for r but not both. We then use this primitive to build delay decryption.

5.2

New Definitions

In this section, we provide a variety of definitions for single decryptor encryption in different settings. We start with the simplest scenario where an adversary is given a quantum decryption key
and is asked to clone it. We raise this to the public key setting where now the adversary is also given
access to the encryption key.
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We then move on to the setting where there is a way to generate a classical common reference
string crs together with a classical encryption key ek. The adversary can use the crs to generate a
pair (pk, sk ). Given (ek, pk) one can generate ciphertexts. We require that the adversary, is not able
to clone sk before seeing any ciphertext. Then, as before, we consider the public-key scenario and
where the adversary is also given ek or, equivalently, crs is sufficient to generate ciphertexts.

5.2.1 Honest Generation of Keys
In this subsection, we are interested in definitions where the encryption and decryption keys are
generated honestly and later are given to the adversary. In subsection 5.2.2, we study a version of
them where the adversary is allowed to generate them.
Definition 23 (Single Decryptor Encryption with Honestly Generated Keys). A single decryptor
encryption with honestly generated keys is a triple of algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) with the following
interface:
• Gen(1n ) : (ek, dk ) takes a security parameter n in unary and returns a secret classical encryption key ek and a quantum decryption key dk .
• Enc(ek, m) : c takes an encryption key and a message m and returns a ciphertext c.
• Dec(dk , c) : m takes a quantum decryption key and a ciphertext and output a message m.
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability over the randomness of the

algorithms. If (ek, dk ) ← Gen(1n ), then for any message m, Dec(dk , Enc(ek, m)) = m.
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Secret-key Security.

For any (computationally unbounded) quantum adversaries A, A0 , A1 ,

there is a negligible function ε such that


 A0 (dk 0 , c) = b
Pr 

 A1 (dk 1 , c) = b


(ek, dk ) ← Gen(1n ) 

1
(m0 , m1 , dk 0 , dk 1 ) ← A(dk ) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n).

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(ek, mb )

Notice that the above definition potentially allows for information theoretic constructions. This
is because the adversary never gets to see the encryption key and therefore cannot create valid ciphertexts.
Selective Security.

The selective security version of the above definition states that the ad-

versary has to decide the messages m0 , m1 before receiving the decryption key. Formally, for any
quantum adversaries A, A0 , A1 , and messages m0 , m1 , there is a negligible function ε such that


 A0 (dk 0 , c) = b
Pr 

 A1 (dk 1 , c) = b

(ek, dk ) ←

Gen(1n )





 ≤ 1 + ε(n).
(dk 0 , dk 1 ) ← A(dk ) 
 2
b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(ek, mb )

We note that in the above two definitions, the adversary A is asked to clone the decryption key
without having access to any valid ciphertext. Indeed, it could be the case that if A is also provided
with a ciphertext then it could clone the decryption key. We deal with such stronger scenarios below. However, even this simplest form has some advantages. As we will see below, it allows for
constructions that do not require high entanglement and perhaps can be implemented even with
today’s technology.
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Public-key Security.

By giving to the adversary access to the encryption algorithm we move to

the computational setting. We require that for any quantum polynomial time adversaries A, A0 , A1 ,
there is a negligible function ε such that


 A0 (dk 0 , c) = b
Pr 

 A1 (dk 1 , c) = b

(ek, dk ) ←

Gen(1n )





1
(m0 , m1 , dk 0 , dk 1 ) ← A(ek, dk ) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n).

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(ek, mb )

Remark 5. Hybrids between the two deﬁnitions where the adversary is not given access to ek but instead access to the encryption oracle Enc(ek, ·) can also be considered. This way one can potentially
achieve security against computationally unbounded adversaries, as long as they are restricted to subexponential number of queries to the encryption oracle.

5.2.2 Dishonest Generation of Keys
Now we introduce an additional algorithm, ParGen that outputs a common reference string together with a secret encryption key. Similarly to the work of Zhandry on quantum lightning Zha19
and Amos et al. on one-shot signatures AGKZ20 , a common reference string is necessary when we
deal with dishonestly generated keys. The reason is that for a fixed encryption scheme that is not
parameterized by a random string, there is always an adversary that can break it.
Definition 24 (Single Decryptor Encryption with Dishonestly Generated Keys). A single decryptor
encryption with dishonestly generated keys is a tuple of algorithms (ParGen, Gen, Enc, Dec) with the
following interface:
• ParGen(1n ) : (crs, td) takes a security parameter n in unary and returns a common reference
string crs and secret trapdoor td.
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• Gen(crs) : (ek, dk ) takes a common reference string and returns an encryption key ek and a
quantum decryption key dk .
• Enc(td, ek, m) : c takes the trapdoor td, an encryption key ek and a message m and returns a
ciphertext c.
• Dec(dk , c) : m takes a quantum decryption key and a ciphertext and output a message m.
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability over the randomness of

the algorithms. If (crs, td) ← ParGen(1n ) and (ek, dk ) ← Gen(crs), then for any message m,
Dec(dk , Enc(td, ek, m)) = m.
Secret-key Security.

For any quantum polynomial time adversaries A, A0 , A1 , there is a negli-

gible function ε such that


 A0 (dk 0 , c) = b
Pr 

 A1 (dk 1 , c) = b

(crs, td) ←

ParGen(1n )





1
(m0 , m1 , dk 0 , dk 1 , ek) ← A(crs) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n).

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(td, ek, mb )

Contrary to the previous scenario, here we cannot hope for an information theoretic definition.
An adversary with unlimited computational power can run the algorithm Gen continuously until it
ends up with the same pk twice. By correctness, both of the corresponding decryption keys will be
valid.
Although the above definition is not as natural as the one below where there is no secret trapdoor, we include it here in an attempt to exhaustively present all different versions of unclonable
decryption. Moreover, as discussed in Section 5.4, this version can be achieved from weaker assumptions.
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Public-key Security.

Here we completely remove the need for a secret trapdoor and we get the

following definition. For any quantum polynomial time adversaries A, A0 , A1 , there is a negligible
function ε such that


 A0 (dk 0 , c) = b
Pr 

 A1 (dk 1 , c) = b


crs ← ParGen(1n ) 

1
(m0 , m1 , dk 0 , dk 1 , ek) ← A(crs) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n).

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(crs, ek, mb )

Remark 6. Similarly to the honest key generation setting, we can consider a hybrid between the above
two security deﬁnitions where the adversary is given oracle access to Enc(td, ·, ·). Additionally, one can
consider a selective security version where the adversary is required to pick the messages m0 , m1 before it
is given the common reference string.

5.2.3 Comparison Between Definitions
In the computational setting the following two implications are straightforward.
• Public-key security implies secret-key security, in both honest and dishonest key generation
settings.
• The existence of a secure scheme with dishonest key generation implies the existence of a
secure scheme with honest key generation, in both the public-key and the secret-key settings,
by incorporating the crs as part of the encryption key.

IND-CCA1 Security.
A comparison between unclonable decryption with honest key generation and standard indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA1) is also interesting. We focus on the
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generalized case of IND-CCA1 where the adversary is allowed to query the decryption oracle in
superposition, a scenario first studied by Boneh and Zhandry BZ13 .
In the public key setting, it holds that security with honest generation of keys implies INDCCA1 security. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exist adversaries A ′ , A ′′ that can
break IND-CCA1 security with non-negligible probability, where A ′ , given the encryption key,
asks for decryption queries and then outputs two messages m0 , m1 and a state s that is given as input
to A ′′ who, given an encryption of mb is requested to find b (for a random b). We can create adversaries A, A0 , A1 that can break unclonability of the decryption key as follows. A receives (ek, dk )
and hands a copy of ek to A ′ . A responds to the decryption queries of A ′ using dk and at the end
of the first phase A ′ outputs a state s and two messages m0 , m1 , which A subsequently forwards as
its challenge messages. Moreover, A outputs dk as an input to A0 and s as an input to A1 . Now A0
receives the original dk and can perform an honest decryption of the challenge ciphertext and distinguish with overwhelming probability. Moreover, A1 given the state s and the challenge ciphertext,
it forwards both to A ′′ and returns what A ′′ returns. Since A ′′ distinguishes with non-negligible
probability, A1 will also distinguish with non-negligible probability.
In the secret key setting, the implication is the same as long as the cloning adversary is also given
access to the encryption oracle.
Relation to Quantum Money and Quantum Lightning.

Single-decryptor encryption

with honest key generation and public-key security yields immediately quantum money. Similarly,
the dishonest version of it yields quantum lightning. Indeed, an unclonable decryption key can be
thought of as a coin (bolt). To verify the coin (bolt), we pick a random message m and we encrypt
it using the encryption key to a ciphertext c. We then use the decryption key to decrypt c and finally
we verify that we get the original message m. If an adversary A could clone the coin (bolt) in a way
that it is accepted by the above verification process, then this attack would also break the single-

96

decryption property.
Similarly, the secret-key security versions of single-decryptor encryption imply secret-key quantum money as well as semi-quantum money as defined by Radian RS19 . A semi-quantum money
scheme is a secret-key quantum money scheme where the generation of new quantum coins does
not take place on the bank’s side. Instead a user can run a classical protocol with the bank, at the end
of which, it ends up with a valid coin.

5.3

Secret-key Encryption with Honestly Generated Keys

We begin our constructions of single decryptor encryption with the simplest possible scenario;
namely, secret-key encryption with security in the setting where the honestly generated keys are
given to the adversary. The key idea is to swap the roles of secret key and ciphertext in the construction of Broadbent and Lord BL19 .
Definition 25 (Unclonable Encryption BL19 ). An unclonable secret-key encryption scheme is a triple
of algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) with the following interface:
• Gen(1n ) : sk takes a security parameter n in unary and returns a classical secret key sk.
• Enc(sk, m) : ct takes a secret key sk and a message m and returns a quantum ciphertext ct .
• Dec(sk, ct ) : m takes a secret key sk and a quantum ciphertext ct and returns a message m.
Correctness.

If sk ← Gen(1n ) then for any message m, Dec(sk, Enc(sk, m)) = m with

overwhelming probability.
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Security.
that

For any adversary A, A0 , A1 and messages m0 , m1 there is a negligible function ε such


 A0 (ct 0 , sk) = b
Pr 

 A1 (ct 1 , sk) = b

sk ←

Gen(1n )





1
b ← {0, 1}, ct ← Enc(sk, mb ) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n).

(ct 0 , ct 1 ) ← A(ct )

Broadbent and Lord have proven that unclonable encryption is possible information theoretically in the random oracle model if A0 and A1 are not entangled.
Lemma 5 (Unconditional Unclonable Encryption BL19 ). There is an unconditional unclonable
encryption scheme in the random oracle model if A0 and A1 are not entangled.
Below we prove the equivalence between existence of unclonable encryption and existence of
single-decryptor encryption. We note that we focus on selective security of single-decryptor encryption; namely, the adversary picks the messages m0 , m1 before seeing the decryption key.
Theorem 19. Single-decryptor selectively secure secret-key encryption in the setting of honestly generated keys exists if and only if unclonable encryption exists.
Proof. We start by constructing a single-decryptor encryption from unclonable encryption. Let
(Gen′ , Enc ′ , Dec ′ ) be an unclonable encryption scheme. We define the single-decryptor scheme
(Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows:
• Gen(1n ) : Sample sk ← Gen′ (1n ) and a randomness r. Let ek = (sk, r) and dk ←
Enc ′ (sk, r) and return (ek, dk ).
• Enc(ek, m) : Parse ek = (sk, r) and return c = (sk, m ⊕ r).
• Dec(dk , c = (sk, d)) : Run r ← Dec ′ (sk, dk ) and return d ⊕ r.
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Correctness is implied by the correctness of the underlying unclonable encryption scheme. We
go on to prove selective security. Assume that there exist adversaries A, A0 , A1 , messages m0 , m1 and
non-negligible function μ such that


 A0 (dk 0 , c) = b
Pr 

 A1 (dk 1 , c) = b

(ek, dk ) ←

Gen(1n )





1
(dk 0 , dk 1 ) ← A(dk ) 
 ≥ 2 + μ(n).

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(ek, mb )

For random r, let m′b = mb ⊕ r and A ′ , A0′ , A1′ be the following:
• A ′ (ct ) : Run (ct 0 , ct 1 ) ← A(ct ).
• A0′ (ct 0 , sk) : Return b ← A0 (ct 0 , (sk, r)).
• A1′ (ct 1 , sk) : Return b ← A1 (ct 1 , (sk, r)).
In the above adversaries, if ct = Enc ′ (sk, m′b ), then (sk, r) = Enc((sk, m′b ), mb ) and follows
the correct distribution since m′b is random and independent of mb . Therefore, we get that there
are messages m′0 , m′1 and adversaries A ′ , A0′ , A1′ that break unclonable encryption with probability
1
2

+ μ(n).
For the opposite direction, assume that there exists a secure single-decryptor encryption scheme

(Gen, Enc, Dec). We define the following unclonable encryption scheme (Gen′ , Enc ′ , Dec ′ ):
• Gen′ (1n ) : Sample sk ← {0, 1}n and return sk.
• Enc ′ (sk, m) : Sample (ek, dk ) ← Gen(1n ) and compute c ← Enc(ek, m). Return ct =
(c ⊕ sk, dk ).
• Dec ′ (sk, ct = (d, dk )) : Return Dec(dk , d ⊕ sk).
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Correctness is implied by the correctness of the underlying single-decryptor encryption. For security, assume that there are adversaries A ′ , A0′ , A1′ and messages m′0 , m′1 that can break the unclonability of ciphertexts with non-negligible probability. Let mb = m′b and define adversaries A, A0 , A1
against single-decryptor security as follows:
• A(dk ) : Sample random sk ← {0, 1}n , set ct = (sk, dk ), run (ct 0 , ct 1 ) ← A ′ (ct ) and
return ((sk, ct 0 ), (sk, ct 1 )).
• A0 ((sk, ct 0 ), c): Return b = A0′ (ct 0 , c ⊕ sk).
• A1 ((sk, ct 1 ), c): Return b = A1′ (ct 1 , c ⊕ sk).
In the above, we note that the states ct 0 , ct 1 are the quantum ciphertexts output by A ′ as attempted
copies of the ciphertext ct = (sk, dk ). It holds that if c = Enc(ek, mb ) then ct = (sk, dk ) =
Enc ′ (c ⊕ sk, mb ) and follows the correct distribution since sk is uniformly random. Therefore, there
are messages m0 , m1 and adversaries A, A0 , A1 that break single-decryptor security with the same
non-negligible probability.
From the above reductions, if A0 , A1 do not share any entanglement then A0′ , A1′ do not share any
entanglement either.
Corollary 1. There exists an unconditional selectively secure single-decryptor secret-key encryption in
the random oracle model as long as A0 and A1 do not share any entanglement.
We note that in the above equivalence we only deal with adversaries who do not have access to
a ciphertext when they attempt to clone the decryption key. In fact, in our construction of singledecryptor encryption from unclonable encryption, a single ciphertext can be combined with the
decryption key to retrieve both sk and r and hence create more copies of the decryption key.
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Impossibility of Unconditional Security.
A natural question is whether one can achieve unconditional security given access to the encryption
oracle (but queried polynomially many times). Unfortunately, unconditional decryption unclonability is impossible even in a weaker form where the adversary is only given access to arbitrarily
many valid ciphertexts of random messages and no access to the encryption oracle. Notice that by
correctness of the encryption scheme and by the information-disturbance trade-off, an adversary,
given several ciphertexts c1 , . . . , ck can efficiently find the corresponding plaintexts m1 , . . . , mk ,
such that ci = Enc(ek, mi ). This is done by decrypting a ciphertext to get the corresponding plaintext and subsequently rewinding to retrieve the original ciphertext and decryption key. Continuing
this way, one can decrypt all given ciphertexts. However, the computational security of Enc implies
that it should behave like a pseudo-random function which does not exist information theoretically.
An interesting question is whether we can achieve single-decryption encryption given many ciphertexts from standard cryptographic assumptions.

5.4

Public-key Encryption with Dishonestly Generated Keys

In this section we aim for a construction that satisfies security against dishonestly generated keys
in the public-key setting. Toward this, we assume the existence of one-shot signatures AGKZ20 ; i.e.,
signatures where no adversary, given a common reference string, can output a public key, two different messages and a valid signature for each of the messages. We also assume extractable witness
encryption GGSW13,GKP

+ 13

.

Theorem 20. If one-shot signatures and extractable witness encryption exist, then unclonable decryption with dishonest generation of keys exists.
Proof. Let (ParGen′ , Gen ′ , Sign ′ , Ver′ ) be a one-shot signature. We define our encryption scheme
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(ParGen, Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows:
• ParGen(1n ) : Return crs ← ParGen′ (1n ).
• Gen(crs) : Return (pk, sk ) ← Gen ′ (crs).
• Enc(crs, pk, m) : Pick a random x ← {0, 1}n , run c ← Enc′ (x, m) and return (x, c), where
(Enc′ , Dec′ ) is a witness encryption scheme with respect to the language RL = {(x, σ) :
Ver(crs, pk, x, σ) = 1}.
• Dec(sk , (x, c)) : Run on superposition s ← Sign(sk , x) and do not measure s. Then run on
superposition m ← Dec′ (c, s) and measure m to retrieve a classical value m. Finally, rewind
the computation and retrieve sk .
The correctness of the construction is implied by the underlying correctness of one-shot signatures and witness encryption.
To argue security, assume that there exist algorithms A, A0 , A1 that break unclonability with
dishonestly generated keys with non-negligible probability. In the original game, call it H0 , the challenge ciphertext c is chosen such that c ← Enc′ (x, mb ) for randomly chosen x.
Let H1 be a hybrid where we generate two ciphertexts c0 , c1 with corresponding language instances x0 , x1 chosen uniformly at random such that x0 ̸= x1 . The ciphertext cb is given to the
adversary Ab . Since the two adversaries are isolated, the winning probabilities in H0 and H1 differ by
a negligible amount.
By assumption, we know that Pr[A0 (sk 0 , Enc(crs, pk, mb )) = b0 ] ≥ 1/2 + ε(n) for some nonnegligible function ε. Thus, by invoking the witness extractor E(1n , sk 0 , x0 ) we can get a witness σ0
such that Ver(crs, pk, x0 , σ0 ) = 1 with non-negligible probability. Similarly, we can get a witness σ1
for x1 . Hence, we can break security of one-shot signatures with non-negligible probability.
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Remark 7 (Running Dec′ on Superposition). The above construction has a desirable property that
the secret key can remain unchanged after arbitrarily many decryptions. As we described above, this is
a result of the gentle measurement lemma that states that a deterministic computation does not disturb
the system and hence we can rewind to our original key. On the negative side, this construction has
the disadvantage that the honest decryptor is required to run the decryption algorithm of the witness
encryption scheme Dec′ on superposition. A way to avoid this, is to start with a single-signer signature
as deﬁned by Amos et al. AGKZ20 instead of a one-shot signature. Such a signature guarantees that two
isolated adversaries cannot sign messages with respect to the same veriﬁcation key. In this case, the secret
key has to evolve after every signature and the signature and secret key sizes increase with the number of
applications of the signing algorithm. On the positive side, by using such a signature scheme we can run
Dec′ classically and without the need to rewind to retrieve the original key.
Secret key Security.

In the case of secret key security, while still in the scenario of dishon-

estly generated keys (Definition 24), one can use a weaker cryptographic primitive than one-shot
signatures, namely privately verifiable one-shot signatures. Here, together with the crs the verifier
outputs also a secret trapdoor td that can be used to verify a signature. Since Brakersky et al. BCM
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have shown that privately-verifiable one-shot signatures exist under the learning-with-errors (LWE)
assumption, we can conclude that:
Corollary 2. If LWE holds and extractable witness encryption exists, then unclonable secret-key decryption with dishonestly generated keys exists.
Honestly Generated Keys.

In the case of honestly generated keys, it is enough to use tokens

for digital signatures as defined by Ben-David and Sattath BS17 , instead of one-shot signatures, which
can be thought of as the honest key generation variant of one-shot signatures. Ben-David and Sattath have shown that such signatures are possible from a classical oracle. Later Zhandry Zha19 showed
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how to securely obfuscate the classical oracle using indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way
functions.
Corollary 3. If indistinguishability obfuscation, one-way functions and witness-extractable witness
encryption exist, then unclonable decryption with honestly generated keys exists.

5.5

Broadcast Encryption with Unclonable Decryption

In a broadcast encryption scheme, there is a way to generate a public key together with a set of N
decryption keys in an way that allows us to encrypt a message with respect to any subset S ⊆ [N] of
the holders of these keys. Security guarantees that only the authorized holders can decrypt. Here we
impose the requirement that the decryption keys are unclonable.
Definition 26 (Broadcast Encryption with Unclonable Decryption). A broadcast encryption scheme
with unclonable decryption is a tuple of algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) with the following interface:
• Gen(1n , N) : (pk, sk 1 , . . . , sk N ) takes a security parameter n in unary and an integer N and
returns a master public key mpk and N quantum secret keys.
• Enc(mpk, S, m) : c takes a master public key mpk, a set S ⊆ [N] and a message m and
returns a ciphertext c.
• Dec(S, i, sk , c) : m takes a set S, an index i, a quantum secret key sk and a ciphertext c and
returns a message m.
Correctness.

The following holds with overwhelming probability. For all messages m, sets S ⊆

[N] and i ∈ S, if c ← Enc(mpk, S, m) then Dec(S, i, sk i , c) = m, where (mpk, sk 1 , . . . , sk N ) ←
Gen(1n , N).
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Security.

For any integer N and any quantum polynomial time adversaries A, A1 , . . . , AN , there

is a negligible function ε such that


 k > |S ∩ T|

Pr 
 ∀i ∈ [k],

Ai (si , c) = b


(mpk, sk 1 , . . . , sk N ) ← Gen(1n , N) 

1
(S, m0 , m1 , s1 , . . . , sk ) ← A KDer (mpk) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n),

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(mpk, S, mb )

where KDer queried classically on an index i, returns sk i and adds i to the initially empty set T.
Succinctness.

The size of the master public key mpk and the size of the ciphertexts c is indepen-

dent of N; the size of the decryption keys sk i is logarithmic in N.
Security can be interpreted as follows. The adversary picks a set S that he will be challenged on.
He also gets to query secret keys for a number of users through the KDer algorithm; call this set T.
He may be even be able to query keys from S, in which case S ∩ T ̸= ∅. He then creates k quantum
states that he distributes to k non-communicating adversaries. Finally, the challenger encrypts either
m0 or m1 at random, with respect to the set of users S and sends the ciphertext c to all k adversaries.
We require that at most |S ∩ T| can distinguish the encryptions. The intuition is that the adversary
could have distributed the k secret keys he possesses in S ∩ T to different adversaries, who would all
then be able to predict b with certainty. But any more, and at least one of the adversaries will fail.
Theorem 21. Broadcast encryption with unclonable decryption exists if tokens for digital signatures,
extractable witness encryption and collision resistant hash functions exist.
Proof. First, if we do not require succinctness, then we can trivially create such a scheme by setting
mpk = (pk1 , . . . , pkN ) and using a standard single-decryptor public-key encryption scheme with
honestly generated keys.
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To achieve succinctness, we make use of Merkle trees. Let (Gen ′ , Sign, Ver) be a token for signature scheme. For a list l of N elements, let H(l) be the Merkle hash of l with respect to a collision
resistant hash function and let Open(H(l), i, π) = li be the corresponding opening function; i.e. π
contains the nodes in the path to the root together with their siblings in the Merkle tree. We create a
broadcast encryption scheme with unclonable decryption (Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows:
• Gen(1n , N) : For i ∈ [N], generate (pki , sk i ) ← Gen ′ (1n ) and set mpk = H(pk1 , . . . , pkN )
and sk i = (pki , τi , sk i ), where τi is a proof that pki is in the i’th position in the list of public
keys that map to mpk.
• Enc(mpk, S, m) : Let v ∈ {0, 1}N such that vi = 1 if and only if i ∈ S and let h =
H(v1 , . . . , vN ). Moreover, sample x ← {0, 1}n and return (h, x, Enc′ ((mpk, h, x), m)),
where Enc′ is a witness encryption for the language
L = {((mpk, h, x), (i, pk, τ, π, σ)) : Open(mpk, τ, i) = pk,
Open(h, π, i) = 1,
Ver(pk, x, σ) = 1}.
• Dec(S, i, (pk, τ, sk ), (h, x, c)) : Use S, i to find π such that Open(h, π, i) = 1. Moreover, in superposition, generate s ← Sign(sk , x) and again in superposition run m ←
Dec′ (c, (i, pk, τ, π, σ)). Measure m to retrieve a classical message m, return m and rewind to
the original decryption key.
Correctness.

Given S, i such that i ∈ S one can generate a proof π such that Open(h, π, i) =

1. Moreover, by construction, Open(mpk, τ, i) = pk and by correctness of tokens for signatures,
Ver(pk, x, Sign(sk , x)) = 1. Hence, decryption succeeds.
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Security.

Assume that there exists an adversary A, A1 , . . . , AN that can break security with

non-negligible probability. Let S, T be the corresponding sets and k > |S ∩ T|. By extractable
security, there exist extractors E1 , . . . , Ek , such that (i, pki , τi , πi , σi ) ← Ei (si , (h, x, c)) and
Open(mpk, τi , i) = pki , Open(h, πi , i) = 1 and Ver(pki , x, σi ) = 1 with non-negligible probability. Let R be the set of indices returned by the extractors and {pk∗i }i∈R the corresponding public
keys returned by the extractors.
Define the following events:
E1 = {R ⊆ S ∩ T and {pk∗i }i∈R ⊆ {pki }i∈S∩T
E2 = {R ⊆ S ∩ T and {pk∗i }i∈R ̸⊆ {pki }i∈S∩T }
E3 = {R ̸⊆ S}
E4 = {R ̸⊆ T}
and by assumption, it holds that the sum Pr[E1 ] + Pr[E2 ] + Pr[E3 ] + Pr[E4 ] is non-negligible, which
implies that at least one of these events happens with non-negligible probability.
• Suppose Pr[E1 ] is non-negligible and let pk = pk∗i = pk∗j , for some i ̸= j ∈ S ∩ T. Sampling
random x, x′ , and running the extractor Ei (si , (h, x, Enc′ ((mpk, h, x), mb )) as well as the
extractor Ej (sj , (h, x′ , Enc′ ((mpk, h, x′ ), mb )), we retrieve two signatures for two different x
under the same public key pk which constitutes an attack against the tokens for signatures.
• Suppose Pr[E2 ] is non-negligible and let pk∗ ̸= pki for all i ∈ S ∩ T. It follows that the
adversary was able to open mpk in some position i with two different public keys, which
yields a collision within the Merkle tree of mpk with non-negligible probability.
• Suppose Pr[E3 ] is non-negligible and let i ∈ R\S which implies that vi = 0. Let π∗i be the
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corresponding opening such that Open(h, π∗i , i) = 1. It follows that π∗i yields a collision
within the Merkle tree of h with non-negligible probability.
• Suppose Pr[E4 ] is non-negligible and let i ∈ R\T; i.e. the adversary never queried the secret
key for i, yet it managed to sign with respect to pki . This implies a break in the security of
quantum signing tokens. To see this, notice that an adversary could sign two different messages by first running the extractor defined above and subsequently use the original quantum
signing message to generate a signature for a second message. Formally, our adversary B on
input (pk, sk ) first generates N − 1 more pairs and sets up the master public key. Subsequently he runs the adversary A and the extractors out of which, one will return a signature
under pk with non-negligible probability. Since Pr[E4 ] is non-negligible, it holds that B
never sent sk to A. Hence, A can use sk to generate a second signature.
Succinctness.

To argue succinctness notice that |mpk| = n the size of the security parameter,

assuming that our hash function’s co-domain is {0, 1}n . Moreover, the size of the ciphertext |c| =
O(n) assuming the witness encryption ciphertext grows with the size of the instance. Moreover, the
size of the decryption key is O(n log N), since it includes two hash values for each level in the Merkle
trees and O(n) qubits for the quantum token.
Remark 8. As is the case with all primitives in this work, we can deﬁne two different versions of a
primitive: one with honestly generated keys and one with dishonestly generated keys. For the purpose
of deﬁning a generic deﬁnition of broadcast encryption with unclonable decryption and for simplicity
of the deﬁnitions, in the above we considered only the version where the decryption keys are generated
honestly by the key generation algorithm Gen. This is exactly the reason why we can get away with just
signing tokens. By replacing the tokens with one-shot signatures, we can give a more powerful construction where the adversary gets to pick all decryption keys, yet |S| + 1 isolated adversaries cannot decrypt
an encryption with respect to S.
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5.6

Splittable Attribute-based Encryption

Definition 27 (Splittable Attribute-based Encryption). A splittable attribute based encryption is a
tuple of algorithms (ParGen, Gen, Split , Enc, Dec) with the following interface:
• ParGen(1n ) : crs takes a security parameter n in unary and returns a common reference string
crs.
• Gen(crs) : (pk, sk ) takes a common reference string crs and outputs a classical encryption key
pk and a quantum decryption key sk .
• Split (sk , q) : (sk 0 , sk 1 ) takes a quantum decryption key and a predicate q and outputs two
keys sk 0 , sk 1 .
• Enc(crs, pk, m, x) : c takes a public key pk, a message m and an attribute x and outputs a
ciphertext c.
• Dec(sk , c) : m takes a quantum secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a message m.
Correctness.

The following hold with overwhelming probability over crs and the randomness

of the algorithms. For a secret key sk , let psk be its predicate such that if (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs) then
psk (x) = 1 for all attributes x. Moreover, if (sk 0 , sk 1 ) ← Split (sk , q), then psk 0 (x) = psk (x) ∧ q(x)
and psk 1 (x) = psk (x) ∧ ¬q(x). Last, Dec(sk , Enc(crs, pk, m, x)) = m if psk (x) = 1.
Security.

For any quantum polynomial time algorithms A, A0 , A1 there exists a negligible func-

tion ε such that


 A0 (sk 0 , c) = b
Pr 

 A1 (sk 1 , c) = b


crs ← ParGen(1n ) 

1
(m0 , m1 , sk 0 , sk 1 , pk, x) ← A(crs) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n),

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc (crs, pk, mb , x)
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where sk 0 , sk 1 can potentially be entangled.
Theorem 22. If one-shot signatures and extractable witness encryption exist, then splittable attributebased encryption exists.
Proof. Let (ParGen′ , Gen ′ , Sign, Ver) be a one-shot signature. Define splittable attribute-based
encryption as follows:
• ParGen(1n ) : Return crs ← ParGen(1n ).
• Gen(crs) : Return Gen ′ (crs).
• Split (sk , q) :
1. Parse sk = (l, sk ′ ) where l is a list l = [(pki , pk′i , qi , σi )]i∈[k] .
2. Sample (pkk+1 , sk k+1 ) ← Gen(crs) and (pk′k+1 , sk ′k+1 ) ← Gen(crs).
3. Generate signature σk+1 ← Sign(sk ′ , (pkk+1 , pk′k+1 , q)).
4. Append (pkk+1 , pk′k+1 , qk+1 , σk+1 ) to l.
5. sk 0 = (l, sk k+1 ) and sk 1 = (l, sk ′k+1 ).
6. Return (sk 0 , sk 1 ).
• Enc(crs, pk, m, x) : Let (Enc′ , Dec′ ) be a witness encryption for the language
RL = {((x, r), (l, σ)) : l = [(pki , pk′i , qi , σi )]i∈[k] ,

Ver(crs, pkk , r, σ) ∨ Ver(crs, pk′k , r, σ)
∀i∈[k] (Ver(crs, pki−1 , (pki , pk′i , qi ), σi ) ∧ qi (x) = 1)

∨(Ver(crs, pk′i−1 , (pki , pk′i , qi ), σi ) ∧ ¬qi (x) = 1) },
where pk0 = pk′0 = pk. Return (r, c = Enc′ (x, m)), for random r.
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• Dec(sk , (r, c)) :
1. Parse sk = (l, sk ′ ) where l is a list l = [(pki , pk′i , qi , σi )]i∈[k]
2. On superposition, run s ← Sign(sk ′ , r), without measuring s.
3. On superposition, run m ← Dec′ (c, (l, s)), measure m to retrieve a classical message
m. Rewind to retrieve sk ′ and return m.
Intuitively, our construction can be split into two parts: in the first part, we create a type of splittable attribute-based signatures where the key, initially being able to sign a message with any attribute, is split into two keys each being able to sign messages with attributes x satisfying q(x) and
¬q(x) respectively. Subsequently, we use witness encryption to turn our scheme into an encryption.
We now go on to prove correctness and security.
Correctness.

We will prove correctness by induction. In the base case, for any x, it holds that

(x, ([], Sign(sk , x))) ∈ RL , where (pk, sk ) ← Gen(crs) and therefore, psk (x) = 1.
For the induction step, suppose that for a secret key sk = (l, sk ′ ), with |l| = k, it holds that
Dec(sk , Enc(crs, pk, m, x)) = m for any x such that psk (x) = 1. Let (sk 0 , sk 1 ) ← Split (sk , q).
We have that sk 0 = (l|(pkk+1 , pk′k+1 , q, σ), sk k+1 ) and Ver(crs, pkk , (pkk+1 , pk′k+1 , q), σk+1 ) =
1. Moreover, for any r, we have that Ver(crs, pkk+1 , r, Sign(sk k+1 , r)) = 1 with overwhelming
probability. It follows that for any x such that psk (x) = 1 and q(x) = 1, the pair
((l|(pkk+1 , pk′k+1 , q, σ)), Sign(sk k+1 , r)) ∈ RL
and by correctness of the underlying witness encryption, decryption succeeds. Similarly for sk 1 .
Security.

To argue security, we will use a witness extractor. Assume for the sake of contradic-

tion, that there exists an adversary A, A0 , A1 that breaks unclonability with non-negligible probabil-
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ity.
Define a hybrid game in which the two ciphertexts c0 , c1 are encrypted using randomness r0 ̸= r1
respectively. This hybrid is information theoretically indistinguishable from the original game, since
the probability that r0 = r1 is negligible.
Using the existence of A0 , A1 , the extractable security of witness encryption, and a standard forking lemma, there exist extractors E0 , E1 such that


 ((x, r0 ), E0 (sk 0 , c)) ∈ RL
Pr 

 ((x, r1 ), E1 (sk 1 , c)) ∈ RL

crs ←

ParGen(1n )





 ≥ 1 + μ(n),
(m0 , m1 , sk 0 , sk 1 , pk, x) ← A(crs) 
 2
b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc (crs, pk, mb , x)

for some non-negligible function μ. Let (lb , σb ) be the output of the extractor Eb . In case l0 = l1 ,
we have Ver(crs, pkk , r0 , σ0 ) = Ver(crs, pkk , r1 , σ1 ) or Ver(crs, pk′k , r0 , σ0 ) = Ver(crs, pk′k , r1 , σ1 ),
depending on whether x satisfies the predicate corresponding to pkk or not. Thus, security of oneshot signatures is compromised with non-negligible probability.
In case l0 ̸= l1 , let i be the length of the longest common prefix between l0 and l1 and let qi be the
corresponding predicate. If qi (x) = 1, the (i + 1)’th elements in both lists contain signatures with
respect to pki . If qi (x) = 0, the (i + 1)’th elements in both lists contain signatures with respect to
pk′i . Thus, with non-negligible probability the two witnesses contain two signatures with respect to
the same public key, violating security of one-shot signatures.

5.7

Revocable Time-Released Encryption

There are several potential ways we can strengthen the notion of public-key encryption with unclonable decryption. In this section we aim for two different directions. First, we introduce the
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notion of delay decryption. Here an adversary not only is unable to clone the decryption key, but
in fact, it can decrypt only once per some time interval t. Subsequently, we further strengthen the
definition to allow revocation. Here one can provide a classical proof that they stopped decrypting.
As long as this proof is generated before time t has passed, we are sure that no-one can decrypt this
ciphertext.

5.7.1 Revocable Delayed Signatures
To build revocable delayed decryption, we first extend the notion of delayed signatures to support
revocation. We can then use this primitive in the encryption setting.
Definition 28 (Revocable Delayed Signatures). A delay signature scheme is revocable if there are two
additional algorithms (Rev, RVer) with the following interface:
• Rev(sk , m) : (π, sk ′ ) takes a quantum secret key sk and a message m and returns a proof π
that m is revoked, and an updated key sk ′ .
• RVer(crs, pk, m, π) : b takes a common reference string crs, a public key pk, a message m and
a proof π and outputs a bit b.
Correctness.

We require two properties:

• If a message has not been revoked, then it can be signed.
• If a message has not been signed, then it can be revoked.
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Security.

A message cannot both be revoked and signed; i.e., for any adversary A there is a negligi-

ble function ε such that


Pr 

RVer(crs, pk, m, π) = 1
Ver(crs, pk, m, rd, fd, σ) = 1


crs ← ParGen(1n ) 
 ≤ ε(n).
(pk, m, rd, fd, σ, π) ← A(crs)

Notice that security of delayed signatures requires that at least time rd passes before one signs a
message. Therefore, if one is able to generate a revocation proof before time rd passes, then we can
be sure that no one will be able to sign this message.
Theorem 23 (Revocable Delayed Signatures). Revocable delayed signatures exist if one-shot signatures and proofs of sequential work exist.
Proof. We make use of the construction of delayed signatures by Amos et al. AGKZ20 from one-shot
signatures and proofs of sequential work. In their construction, they use a delegation mechanism
where the signature of one message has to include the signatures of all previous messages. As a result, their construction is also an ordered signature where each tag ti = ti−1 + 1.
To revoke a specific message, all we have to do is to sign it along the flag rev without any delays.
In order to verify if a message has been revoked, we check the chain of signatures to verify that this
message is in it. Moreover, we modify our signature verification scheme to reject a signature of any
message m, if m has been signed with the flag rev. Formally,
• Rev(sk , m) : Return Sign(sk , (m, rev), 0, 0).
• Ver(crs, pk, m, rd, fd, σ) : Run the original verification. If it accepts, parse σ as a list of
signatures (mi , σi , rdi , fdi ) and accept if mi ̸= (m, rev) for all i.
• RVer(crs, pk, m, π) : Run the original verification. If it accepts, parse π as a list of signatures
(mi , σi , rdi , fdi ) and accept if mi = (m, rev) for some i.
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To prove correctness, notice that if (m, rev) has never been signed then by correctness of the
original delayed signature the new verification accepts. Moreover, if (m, rev) has been signed then,
again by correctness of the original delayed signature, RVer accepts. To prove security, we make
use of the fact that all previous signatures have to be included in the new one. Therefore, if RVer
accepts a proof for a message m then (m, rev) is in the list, in which case Ver will reject. On the
other direction, if Ver accepts a signature for a message m then (m, rev) is not in the list, in which
case RVer rejects.

5.7.2 Delayed Decryption
We move one to define a delayed decryption scheme. Similarly to the signature case, the encryption
and decryption algorithms are parameterized by two integers rd, fd, corresponding to time before
and after a decryption.
Definition 29 (Delayed Decryption). A delayed decryption scheme is an unclonable encryption
scheme with the following modiﬁcations.
• Enc(crs, pk, m, rd, fd) : c the encryption algorithm takes additionally two non-negative
integers rd, fd and outputs a ciphertext c.
Correctness.

For any integers rd, fd, Dec(sk , Enc(crs, pk, m, rd, fd)) = m with overwhelming

probability.
Security.

Similarly to delayed signatures, we want the following two properties:

• One cannot decrypt a message in time less than rd. Formally, for any adversary A, A ′ and any
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constant α there exists a negligible function ε such that



′
Pr 
 A (sk , c) = b


ParGen(1n )

crs ←





1
(m0 , m1 , rd, fd, pk, sk ) ← A(crs) 
 ≤ 2 + ε(n),

b ← {0, 1}, c ← Enc(crs, pk, mb , rd, fd)

where A ′ runs in time (1 − α)rd.
• One cannot decrypt all ciphertexts in time less than

P

i rdi

+ fdi − maxi fdi . Formally, for any

adversary A, A ′ and constant α there exists a negligible function ε such that





Pr  A ′ (sk , (ci )i ) = (bi )i




where A ′ runs in time (1 − α)

crs ← ParGen(1n )





((rdi , fdi )i∈[k] , m0 , m1 , pk, sk ) ← A(crs) 
1

 ≤ + ε(n),
 2
∀i ∈ [k], bi ← {0, 1} 

ci ← Enc(crs, pk, mbi , rdi , fdi )
P

i rdi


+ fdi − maxi fdi .

Notice that this definition trivially implies unclonable decryption, since if one could clone the
decryption key then they could decrypt two messages in parallel in time max{rd1 , rd2 } < rd1 + rd2 .
Proposition 1. An encryption scheme with delayed decryption is also an encryption scheme with unclonable decryption.

5.7.3 Classically Revocable Decryption
Similarly to delayed signatures, public-key encryption with classically revocable decryption is a delay encryption scheme equipped with an additional revoking functionality. By revoking a specific
ciphertext, we irreversibly update our secret key into a new one that is unable to decrypt this ci-
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phertext. For such a definition to make sense we have to update our key before time t has passed.
Otherwise, we can decrypt and then rewind and revoke this ciphertext.
Definition 30 (Classically Revocable Decryption). An encryption scheme with classically revocable
decryption is a delay encryption scheme with two additional algorithms (Rev, Ver) with the following
interface:
• Rev(sk , c) : (π, sk ′ ) takes a quantum secret key sk , a ciphertext c and outputs a proof π and
an updated secret key sk ′ .
• Ver(crs, pk, c, π) : b takes a common reference string crs, a ciphertext c and a proof π and
outputs a bit b.
Correctness.

Additionally, the following hold with overwhelming probability.

• If a ciphertext has not been revoked then it can be decrypted.
• If a ciphertext has not been decrypted then it can be revoked.
Security.

A ciphertext cannot be decrypted after being revoked in time; i.e., for any quantum poly-

nomial time adversary A, A ′ , A ′′ and any constant α there is a negligible function ε such that





 RVer(crs, pk, c, π) = 1

Pr 

b = b′






b ← {0, 1}, crs ← ParGen(1n ) 

(m0 , m1 , rd, fd, pk, sk ) ← A(crs) 


1

≤ + ε(n),
c ← Enc(crs, pk, mb , rd, fd) 
 2

′
′
(π, sk ) ← A (sk , c) 


b′ ← A ′′ (sk ′ , c)

where A ′ runs in time (1 − α)rd.
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Theorem 24. If classically revocable proofs of sequential work and extractable witness encryption exist,
then public key encryption with classically revocable decryption exists.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we make the assumption that a witness extractor in our witness
encryption scheme, runs in the same time as that of the distinguisher. This is to simplify the proofs.
Without this assumption, we would have to incorporate any additional delay posed by the extractor
into the construction of our encryption scheme.
Let (ParGen′ , Gen ′ , Sign ′ , Ver′ , Rev ′ , RVer′ ) be a revocable signature scheme. We define the
corresponding encryption algorithms:
• ParGen(1n ) : Return crs ← ParGen′ (1n ).
• Gen(crs) : Return (pk, sk ) ← Gen ′ (crs).
• Enc(crs, pk, m, rd, fd) : Pick randomness r and return (r, rd, fd, Enc′ (m)), where Enc′ is a
witness encryption for {(r, w) : Ver′ (crs, pk, r, rd, fd, w) = 1}.
• Dec(sk , (r, rd, fd, c)) : Generate w ← Sign(sk , r, rd, fd) and return Dec′ (c, w). Subsequently, rewind to retrieve the original key.
• Rev(sk , (r, rd, fd, c)) : Return (π, sk ′ ) ← Rev ′ (sk , r).
• RVer(crs, pk, (r, rd, fd, c), pk) : Return b ← RVer′ (crs, pk, r, π).
Correctness follows from the correctness of revocable signatures and the correctness of witness
encryption. We go on to prove our two security properties; namely delayed security and revocable
security.
Delayed Security.

Suppose that there is a constant α and an adversary A, A ′ that can distin-

guish between encryptions of two messages in less than (1 − α)rd time. A ′ implies the existence of an
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extractor E that can find a signature for the randomness incorporated in the ciphertext. We create
an adversary B, B ′ that can sign a random message in almost the same time as follows:
• B(crs) : Generate (m0 , m1 , rd, fd, pk, sk ) ← A(crs) and return (rd, fd, pk, (m0 , m1 , sk ))
where the last tuple is the secret key for B ′ .
• B ′ ((m0 , m1 , sk ), (r, rd, fd, c)) : Run w ← E(r, (m0 , m1 , c, rd, fd, sk )) and return w.
By extractable security of the witness encryption, Ver′ (crs, pk, r, fd, rd, w) = 1 with non-negligible
probability. Moreover, since the running time of E is that of A ′ , we conclude that B ′ runs in time
(1 − α)rd + c, for constant c.
Moreover, suppose that there is a constant α and an adversary A, A ′ that can distinguish enP
cryptions of two messages in time (1 − α)( i∈[l] rdi + fdi − maxi∈[l] fdi ). Again, by invoking
a signature extractor from the distinguisher A ′ we are able to sign all l random messages in time
P
(1 − α)( i∈[l] rdi + fdi − maxi∈[l] fdi ) + c, for constant c reaching a contradiction.
Revocable Security.

Assume adversaries A, A ′ , A ′′ such that although A ′ revokes a cipher-

text in time less than rd, A ′′ is still able decrypt it subsequently with non-negligible probability. We
will create an adversary B that can both sign and revoke a message with non-negligible probability.
The adversary B first runs (m0 , m1 , rd, fd, pk, sk ) ← A(crs) then picks a randomness b, r and
computes c ← Enc(crs, pk, mb , rd, fd). Subsequently, it runs (π, sk′ ) ← A ′ (sk , c). Then, by
security of witness encryption, it uses an extractor E(sk ′ , c), corresponding to the distinguisher A ′′ ,
in order to find a signature σ for r. It finally returns (pk, r, rd, fd, σ, π) which breaks security with
non-negligible probability.
Notice that if A ′ could run for time (1 − α)rd, then it could both decrypt and rewind and subsequently generate a proof of revocation without ever learning a classical signature for the randomness
r.
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Αν σηκώσεις το χέρι να χτυπήσεις, τότε χτύπα.
Ελένη Παρτσάλη, η δασκάλα μου στο πιάνο

A

Summary of Security Definitions

Here we include all security definitions of one-shot authentication and single decryption encryption
for easier access. The definitions are given in a code-based game-playing manner for formality BR06 .
In the caption of each figure we also describe the state of the art constructions as of September 16,
2020.
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Initialize(1n )
crs ← Gen(1n )
return crs

Finalize(vk, m0 , σ0 , m1 , σ1 )
return Ver(crs, vk, m0 , σ0 ) = Ver(crs, vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

Figure A.1: One-Shot Signatures. We only know of a candidate construc on AGKZ20 .

Initialize(1n )
Verify(vk, m, σ)
n
(crs, td) ← Gen(1 )
return Ver(td, vk, m, σ)
return crs
Finalize(vk, m0 , σ0 , m1 , σ1 )
return Ver(td, vk, m0 , σ0 ) = Ver(td, vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1
Figure A.2: Privately Veriﬁable One-Shot Signatures with Oracle Veriﬁca on. We note that the veriﬁca on oracle can be

queried in superposi on. The exist rela ve to an oracle uncondi onally AGKZ20

A.1 One-Shot Authentication
The games shown here are played by a quantum adversary. We require that the probability that the
finalize process accepts is negligible.

A.2 Single Decryptor Encryption
Here we include security definitions of unclonable decryption for easier access. We note that in contrast to the authentication setting, single decryptor encryption involves three adversaries A, A0 , A1
where A0 and A1 are isolated; meaning they cannot communicate with each other but they can share
entanglement (unless stated otherwise). The adversary A calls the initialization process and then
outputs two states s0 , s1 and gives sb to the adversary Ab . Then the two adversaries play the remaining challenge and finalize processes. We require that the probability that both finalize processes,

Initialize(1n )
(crs, td) ← Gen(1n )
return crs

Finalize(vk, m0 , σ0 , m1 , σ1 )
return Ver(td, vk, m0 , σ0 ) = Ver(td, vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1
+

Figure A.3: Privately Veriﬁable One-Shot Signatures. They exist under the learning with errors assump on BCM
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18

.

Initialize(1n )
(sk , vk) ← Gen(1n )
return sk

Finalize(m0 , σ0 , m1 , σ1 )
return Ver(vk, m0 , σ0 ) = Ver(vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

Figure A.4: Privately Veriﬁable Tokens for Signatures also known as 1-out-of-2 Quantum Retrieval Games. They exist
+

uncondi onally Gav12,PYJ

12

.

Initialize(1n )
(sk , vk) ← Gen(1n )
return (sk , vk)

Verify(m, σ)
return Ver(vk, m, σ)

Finalize(m0 , σ0 , m1 , σ1 )
return Ver(vk, m0 , σ0 ) =
Ver(vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

Figure A.5: Tokens for Digital Signatures with Oracle Veriﬁca on. They exist rela ve to an oracle BS17 .

played by the two isolated adversaries, accept, is at most 1/2 + ε(n) for some negligible function ε.

Initialize(1n )
(sk , vk) ← Gen(1n )
return (sk , vk)

Finalize(m0 , σ0 , m1 , σ1 )
return Ver(vk, m0 , σ0 ) = Ver(vk, m1 , σ1 ) = 1

Figure A.6: Publicly Veriﬁable Tokens for Digital Signatures. They exist assuming indis nguishability obfusca on and

one-way func ons Zha19 . In fact, Zhandry shows that public-key quantum money exist assuming indis nguishability
obfusca on and one-way func ons, but his proof extends to this se ng.
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Challenge
return c

Initialize(m0 , m1 )
(ek, dk ) ← Gen(1n )
b ← {0, 1}
c ← Enc(ek, mb )
return dk

Finalize(b′ )
return b = b′

Figure A.7: Selec ve Security of Single Decryptor Secret Key Encryp on. They exist uncondi onally in the random

oracle model as long as A0 , A1 do not share any entanglement and are restricted to sub-exponen al queries to the
random oracle.

Initialize(1n )
(ek, dk ) ← Gen(1n )
b ← {0, 1}
return dk

Challenge(m0 , m1 )
c ← Enc(ek, mb )
return c

Finalize(b′ )
return b = b′

Figure A.8: Adap ve Security of Single Decryptor Secret Key Encryp on. They exist assuming privately veriﬁable tokens

for digital signatures and witness extractable witness encryp on with quantum auxiliary informa on.

Initialize(1n )
(ek, dk ) ← Gen(1n )
b ← {0, 1}
return (ek, dk )

Challenge(m0 , m1 )
c ← Enc(ek, mb )
return c

Finalize(b′ )
return b = b′

Figure A.9: Single Decryptor Public Key Encryp on. They exist assuming publicly veriﬁable tokens for signatures and

witness extractable witness encryp on with quantum auxiliary informa on.

Initialize(1n )
crs ← Gen(1n )
b ← {0, 1}
return crs

Commit(ek)
return

Challenge(m0 , m1 )
c ← Enc(ek, mb )
return c

Finalize(b′ )
return b = b′

Figure A.10: Single Decryptor Public Key Encryp on with dishonest genera on of keys. They exist assuming one-shot

signatures and witness extractable witness encryp on with quantum auxiliary informa on GZ20 .
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